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Executive Summary 
The purpose of this thesis is to perform a case study on the consequences that the collapse of 
the Polcevera viaduct, on the 14th of August of 2018 has had on Autostrade per l’Italia, the 
concessionaire of the A10 highway, and its parent company, Atlantia. In addition, the authors 
sought how such an event impacted the takeover bid of Abertis Infraestructuras by Hochtief, 
ACS and Atlantia, announced on March 2018. The execution of the transaction was being 
conducted at the same time when the tragedy occurred. 
The research has been centered in three main points: 
First, context on the list of events and the chronological order that followed has been conducted.  
In a second stage, an analysis of the impacts from those events is presented. Special emphasis 
has been given in the financial implications that the collapse of the Morandi bridge caused to 
Atlantia, understanding the market crash on the stock and how it was later recovered. 
Additionally, the implications that the collapse had on the acquisition of Abertis were 
determined.  
In a third stage, the thesis took advantage of the uniqueness of situation to provide an answer 
to one of the greatest challenges faced on understanding valuation changes. The study was 
focused in determining how much the changes in the enterprise value of Atlantia right after the 
event and, later in the midterm, were explained by changes attributable to lower cash flows of 
Autostrade and, how much were due to the higher market risk perception reflected on the 
WACC.  
The main conclusions derived are that the market crash was mainly provoked by the over-
reaction that the government of Italy had, as the termination of the concession was seen a very 
likely outcome. From a valuation perspective, the influence on cash flows has been much higher 
rather than the influence derived from the WACC, in a c.75%/25% ratio when looking at the 
market crash. Such a difference has been reduced when moving from the short term to the 
medium term, and the ratio ended at c.66%/33%. Uncertainty on the final costs that Atlantia 
will incur have not been released yet and it explains such a trend. Regarding Abertis, the impact 
of the collapse had been minor if not inexistent in completing the transaction. 
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6M / 1H First six months of the year. 
9M  First nine months of the year. 
A10 Referring to Autostrada A10 or Fiori Autostrade; Italian motorway 
connecting Genoa with Ventimiglia; part of the European route E80; It 
has 158.7 kilometers length. 
Abertis Holdco Refers to the special purpose vehicle created for the acquisition of Abertis 
Infraestructuras S.A. 
Abertis Participaciones Refers to the entity where the 98.7% share capital of Abertis 
Infraestructuras acquired by Hochtief was transferred upon acquisition.  
Abertis/ Abertis 
Infraestructuras 
Refers to Abertis Infraestructuras S.A., Spanish corporation. 
ACS Refers to Actividades de Construcción y Servicios S.A., Spanish 
corporation. 
AENA Refers to Aena SME, S.A., subsidiary of ENAIRE and state-owned 
company managing airports and heliports in Spain. 
ANAS Refers to Azienda Nazionale Autonoma delle Strade; Italian state-owned 
company devoted to the construction and maintenance of the Italian road 
network. 
Atlantia / ATL  Refers to Atlantia SpA, Italian holding company. 
ATVD Aggregate Theoretical Vehicles per Day; equal to number of kilometers 
travelling/journey length/number of days. 
Autostrade / ASPI Refers to Autostrade per l'Italia SpA, Italian corporation. 
ba Beta of the assets of a firm. 
Base Case Refers to the valuation of Autostrade per l'Italia based on the business 
plan pre-collapse of the Morandi bridge. 
BBVA Refers to the Spanish bank Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria. 
bd Beta of the long-term debt of a firm. 
be Equity beta or exposure of the company group of assets to the market 
risk. 
Benetton Group Refers to Benetton Group S.r.l; Italian corporation and well known 
fashion brand. 
bn Abbreviation used for billion. 
BoD / Board Board of Directors of a company. 
BP Refers to British Petroleum plc, or Business Plan. 
bps Basic points: 1/100 of 1%. 
bTS Beta of the Tax-shield of a firm. 
bu Unlevered beta of a firm. 
CAGR  Compounded Annual Growth Rate. 
CAPEX Capital Expenditures. 
CAPM Capital Asset Pricing Model. 
CAS Consorzio per le Autostrade Siciliane. 
CC Cost of Capital or return required by investors in a given group of assets. 
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Cellnex Refers to Cellnex Telecom; Spanish corporation. 
CEO Chief Executive Officer. 
CFO Chief Financial Officer. 
CIF Refers to Código de Identificación Fiscal; number used for identification 
of enterprises in Spain. 
Citi Refers to the US bank entity CitiGroup. 
CNMV Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores. 
ConnecT Refers to the subsidiary of the holding Edizione; Italian corporation. 
CPI Consumer Price Index. 
Criteria Refers to Criteria CaixaHolding; Spanish corporation. 
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility. 
D Market value of long-term debt. 
D&A Depreciation and Amortization. 
DCF Discounted Cash Flow valuation method. 
E / EqV Market value of equity. 
EBIT Earnings Before Interest and Tax. 
EBITDA Earnings Before Interest Tax Depreciation and Amortization. 
EBITDA margin EBITDA over Gross Sales. 
ECB European Central Bank; central banking system of the European Union. 
Edizione Refers to the financial holding of the Benetton family. 
EMEA Europe Middle East and Africa. 
Empa Refers to the Swiss Federal Laboratories for Materials Science and 
Technology. 
EMTN  Euro Medium Term Notes. 
ENAIRE Refers to the Spanish public enterprise responsible for air navigation 
management in Spain, attached to the Ministry of Public Works. 
EU European Union. 
EURIBOR Basic rate of interest used in lending between banks on the European 
Union interbank market, also used as a reference for setting the interest 
rate on other loans. 
Euro/€ Currency type: Euro. 
EV Enterprise Value, understood as market value of equity plus net debt. 
FCF Operating Free Cash Flows to the firm available to all investors, before 
interest payment and after reinvestment needs. 
FED Federal Reserve System; central banking system of the United States of 
America. 
FFO Adjusted Funds from Operations. 
Fitch Refers to the credit rating agency Fitch Group, Inc. 
Five Star 
Movement/M5S 
Refers to the Italian political party: Movimento 5 Stelle. 
FX Refers to Forex or the market in which currencies are traded. 
FY Refers to Financial Year. 
g projected constant growth rate of the cash flows of a firm to infinity. 
G&A costs General and Administrative expenditures. 
GDP Gross Domestic Product. 
Genoa Bypass 
/Bypass/ Gronda di 
Genova 
Genoa Bypass project which includes 72 kilometers of a new motorway 
connecting the junctions bordering the city area of Genoa; See: 
https://www;grondadigenova;it/. 
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GIC Refers to the Singapore Investment Corporation. 
GBP/£ Currency type: Great Britain Pound (United Kingdom). 
Hisdesat Refers to the public enterprise Hisdesat Servicios Estratégicos S.A.; 
Spanish entity. 
Hispasat Refers to Hispasat; the Spanish satellite communications operator. 
Hochtief Refers to Hochtief Aktiengesellschaft , German limited company. 
Ibex 35 Índice Bursátil Español; Benchmark stock market index of Spain. 
IMF International Monetary Fund. 
IRR Internal Rate of Return. 
km Kilometer. 
LTM Refers to: Last Twelve Months. 
m Abbreviation used for million. 
M&A Refers to: Mergers and Acquisitions. 
Medium-term Case It refers to the valuation of Autostrade per l'Italia based on the business 
plan 6 months after the collapse of the Morandi bridge. 
MM Modigliani and Miller. 
Moody's Refers to the credit rating agency Moody's CreditView. 
NPV Net Present Value. 
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
OPEX Operational Expenditures. 
PE ratio Price to Earnings ratio. 
Pillar 9 Refers to the pillar of the Morandi bridge that collapsed on the 14th of 
August 2018. 
PP Refers to the Spanish political party: Partido Popular. 
PPPs Refers to Public-Private Partnerships; type of contract involved in 
infrastructure provision. 
PSOE Refers to the Spanish political party: Partido Socialista Obrero Español. 
rd Pre-tax market expected yield to maturity of long-term debt. 
re Market value of expected return on equity. 
REE Refers to Red Eléctrica de España; Spanish corporation. 
rf Risk free rate. 
rm-rf Market risk premium. 
S&P Refers to the credit rating agency Standard & Poor's. 
Short-term Case It refers to the valuation of Autostrade per l'Italia based on the business 
plan two days after the collapse of the Morandi bridge. 
SPV Special Purpose Vehicle. 
tc corporate marginal tax rate. 
The League Refers to the Italian political party: Lega Nord per l'Independenza della 
Padania. 
TV Terminal Value. 
VU Value of an unlevered firm. 
WACC Weighted Average Cost of Capital used as a Cost of Capital attributable 
to a corporation. 
WC Working Capital. 
y-o-y Year on Year. 
σm Variance of the market returns representing volatility of the market. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
The largest M&A deal on the management of infrastructure business took place on May 2018, 
when Abertis was acquired by a consortium formed by ACS, Atlantia and Hochtief for an 
enterprise value of €32.1bn.  
The deal took two years before completion due to the competing bids of the buyers and the 
strategic character of Abertis’ assets for the Spanish Government, among other issues. 
Briefly, Atlantia announced its intention to buy Abertis in May 2017 but a competing bid by 
ACS emerged some months later, locking the two companies in a bid war. An agreement sealed 
one year later between both companies created the basis for a joint bid. 
The process ended with a 20.1% premium pre-rumor price paid to Abertis shareholders fully in 
cash, for a total equity value of €16,519.6m, equivalent to 18.36 €/share. As a result, the new 
consortium created a special purpose vehicle in October 2018, named Abertis Holdco, which 
was registered into the Mercantile Registry of Madrid, to control the new entity.  
The rationale of the deal was to develop a new project in the long-term view, based on the 
experience that Hochtief and ACS have on the construction sector together with the expertise 
of Atlantia as a global operator of transportation infrastructure. Such strength, to be merged 
with the attractive and extensive assets that Abertis held, would allow to gain competitiveness 
of the businesses to all of them. 
The new Abertis Holdco was funded with an equity contribution, totaling €6,909.3m and a debt 
contribution, primarily constituted of several bank loans, of €9,823.9m. The split of ownership 
agreed corresponded to 50% + 1 share for Atlantia, 30% for ACS, and 20% - 1 share for 
Hochtief. As a result, Atlantia is from year ended 2018 integrating Abertis on its consolidated 
accounts. 
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The disbursement effort that ACS, Atlantia and Hochtief committed was of considerable 
importance and, in 2019, refinancing operations to allocate it on the capital structure of each, to 
benefit as much as possible from the synergies derived had become a strategic priority for the 
corporates. 
The resulting group, has linked two of the main construction entities in a global scale (ACS and 
Hochtief) with one of the major transportation infrastructure management portfolio of assets 
worldwide (Atlantia and Abertis), which will allow to diversify its risk, enhancing its global 
exposure and being able to compete for larger projects in consolidated and emerging markets 
where Public Private Partnerships to fund new infrastructure are gaining importance. 
Apart from the challenges that the integration of Abertis would suppose for the entities, another 
event of significance took place on the 14th of August 2018. 
That day, a section of the Polcevera road bridge, on the A10 Genoa-Ventimiglia motorway, 
collapsed under a heavy rain, leaving behind 43 deaths and more than 80 injured people which 
were travelling across the bridge in the city of Genoa. 
The A10 motorway, is part of the infrastructure network managed by the concessionaire 
Autostrade per l’Italia, which since its privatization in 1999, is controlled by Atlantia. The 
concession is constituted of 3,020km of highways in Italy, almost half of the network of the 
country. Additionally, Autostrade represented for Atlantia c.65% of the EBITDA of the group, 
being then, one of its major assets. 
Due to the collapse of the bridge, society was in shock, and the Italian government immediate 
reactions were to threaten with the revocation of the concession of Autostrade to Atlantia in a 
very short time. Consequently, the stock price of Atlantia suffered a great crash, and the group 
lost c.30% of its market capitalization in 2 days. 
Six months after the event, investigations behind the collapse are being conducted by the 
government. The initial tempers have calmed down and a judiciary process has begun trying to 
determine who was the main responsible and how much should he pay for it. Further, the Italian 
government showed its predisposition in revising the current contractual agreements under all 
the concessions held and will decide whether they need to be modified or even revoked, which 
would suppose the nationalization of the assets. 
On the other hand, Atlantia has shown its commitment with a collaborative spirit. The company 
assumed the costs related to the demolition and reconstruction of the new bridge, as well as the 
compensations payable to all the people which was directly affected by the collapse and 
estimated that it will be c.€509m. Also, they are convinced that there is no culpability from their 
side, as they complied with all the requirements established by contract, and thus, did not assume 
any prejudicing liability to be derived from the case in the future. 
After the collapse, the threat of punishments to Atlantia raised the concerns, not only for the 
company itself, but for the implications that it could have on the acquisition of Abertis, limiting 
the viability of the refinancing needed and endangering the agreement reached among the parties. 
Emphasis was given on the lowering of the credit rating that the agencies did on Atlantia and 
Autostrade post-event. In particular, the investment community tried to assess how much would 
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be the added cost for the group to be supported, in a context where a high increase on leverage 
would take place upon consolidating Abertis debt. 
Fortunately, Abertis was acquired as planned, and today, is seen as an asset of even more strategic 
importance for Atlantia, enabling the diversification of its business not only regionally but also 
in reputational terms. 
The refinancing of Abertis acquisition was completed, and the effects for all involved entities 
from the Abertis contribution, as well as the collapse of the bridge are coming to light.  
Finally, to mention that, for a more detailed view on the presented entities above, in the 
Appendix 1 a description of each entity and its main activities can be found. 
 
1.1 Description and goals of the Thesis 
Under the exceptional situation that the presented corporates are facing as a result of the 
sequence of events that took place in the last 2 years, being of major importance, the collapse of 
the bridge soon after announcement of the acquisition of Abertis, the authors will focus on the 
following points: 
1- What has been the impact of this event on the acquisition of Abertis for all the involved parties? 
The fact that the event took place soon after one of the most complex M&A transactions in the 
recent history (the biggest one in the management of infrastructure business) was finally 
accomplished a few months before, allows us to study how such an accident has impacted the 
materialization of the transaction and its involved entities as of today. 
The operation, which involved the creation of a new shared SPV to gain control of Abertis, as 
well as the high leverage provided by banks to pay for the operation, are an area of interest to 
understand the mechanics of M&A financing. 
In particular, the changes on corporate governance, shareholding structure, debt rating 
perceptions and acquisition finance conditions for Abertis will be analyzed for each of the 
participants. 
2- How was the market reaction post-collapse and its evolution in time?  
More specifically, it will be looked in detail the impact on the valuation of Atlantia since that 
day. 
In order to do that, we will link the market information available at the time just right after the 
stock of Atlantia collapsed, to build a DCF. This new model will consider the potential losses of 
Autostrade’s cash flows that the removal of the concession would bring to Atlantia and also the 
changes on WACC. The WACC, being the risk perception that the market had immediately post-
collapse, and estimated by means of consensus of the market as well. 
In a second stage, the impact of time is presented. A new model, considering the information 
available 6 months post event is built and the outcome is compared with the value right after the 
event. 
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Finally, the authors will seek to provide an analysis of the results and set up some empirical 
evidence and pragmatic relationships to assess the impacts of shocks in the enterprise value of 
firms. Emphasis will be put on the relationships between cash flows an WACC, and its evolution 
on time. 
 
1.2 Structure of the Thesis  
The thesis is structured in a way such that the answers to the 2 questions presented above are 
given, ensuring the reader gathers gradually the necessary context to understand the content 
presented. 
The content has been split between 5 chapters plus additional information found in 7 
Appendixes. For ease of clarity, a Glossary of Terms has also been provided and all the 
References used were listed. 
Additionally, for having a comprehensive view of the work done, the thesis is accompanied with 
the valuation of Autostrade per l’Italia. The models developed were done in Microsoft Excel 
and have been a key element to conduct the analysis. Therefore, it is recommended for the reader 
to validate the outputs himself following the guidance given on the Appendixes 6 and 7. 
In order to provide to the reader with a guide on what to expect on the following pages, as well 
as the possibility to filter the topics that could be of interest to him, in the following paragraphs 
the content on each chapter is explained. 
Chapter 1 is the Introduction. The purpose of it is to present to the reader the list of events that 
justify the interest and uniqueness of this case study. Primarily, a summary of the events for the 
Abertis takeover, starting on April 2017, and the posterior collapse of the Morandi bridge, which 
took place on August 2018, are given. Some primary insights on the market shock following the 
disaster are stated and the situation as of 6 months post-collapse is outlined. Secondly, the 
financial and corporate valuation aspects of interest that aroused the curiosity of the authors, as 
well as the intentions that they pursue on this investigation, are explained, separated mainly in 2 
questions, which are: 
1. What has been the impact of this event on the acquisition of Abertis for all the involved parties? 
2. How was the market reaction post-collapse and its evolution in time?   
Chapter 2, the Historical Review of the Main Events, has the objective to provide to the reader 
a complete view on all what happened between April 2017 and end of February 2019. How such 
events affected the main corporates as well as all its stakeholders. The stakeholders include the 
main corporations, the respective governments of Spain and Italy and ultimately, the society. 
The chapter took the form of a journalistic reportage, and, for keeping the logic, it has been split 
in two parts: 
1. In the first part, there is the review on how the acquisition of Abertis was conducted. 
Also, details about the conflicts of interests derived and the involvement on the Spanish 
government are given.  
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2. In the second part, the collapse of the bridge in Genoa is described. From the day that 
occurred, insight is given on the immediate reactions and on the social impact that it had. 
The evolution of the situation is presented. The reader can understand how the transition 
from the primary strong threats of the Italian government, claiming termination of the 
concession would occur immediately, towards the current status, with on-going 
investigations expected to last until Q3 2019, took place. 
Chapter 3 main content and objectives are well summarized by the title “Analysis of the 
consequences of the collapse of the Polcevera viaduct”. It has been divided in 2 main sub-
chapters: 
1. The first one is centered on the impacts that the collapse had for the owners of the 
concessionaire of the A10, Autostrade per l’Italia, and its parent company, Atlantia. To 
provide an answer to question 2 above, three main fields are studied on these corporates. 
Primarily, to observe what corporate governance changes took place. Secondly, how did 
shareholders react on the event and during the subsequent months. Finally, a detailed 
review on the financial impacts that the event supposed for the corporates and its 
shareholders is given. Emphasis is put at the beginning with the market crash, two days 
after the collapse. Next, credit rating agencies lowered the profile of the corporates on 
the view of probable future attributable costs in several forms of punishments. It is 
worth to mention that a detailed description of the implications of termination of the 
concession for all parties is detailed. Remember that, government reactions were the 
main fears that investors had at that time and the outcomes are still not clear, which 
increased the risk perception of the market towards the company’s assets. 
2. The second half aimed to determine which financial impacts were derived from the 
collapse towards the proper completion of the Abertis acquisition, and thus, to provide 
an answer to question 1. The primary financing terms and conditions that Hochtief 
agreed with the bank guarantors are presented. In a second stage, such conditions are 
benchmarked with the new refinancing packages used for the new Abertis Holdco. Note 
that, due to the delisting of Abertis from the Spanish stocks market upon acquisition, 
not all detailed information has been released. Therefore, the authors were limited to use 
public press releases from the corporates and the media at that time, which, in our 
opinion, were enough to conduct a proper study. Similarly, as in the first part, the impact 
on the shareholders for ACS and Hochtief was studied in detail. Finally, a review of the 
contribution that Abertis brought to ACS, Hochtief and Atlantia as of end of 2018 is 
given, extracted from the financial results presented by the entities at that time. 
Chapter 4 is the most analytical part of the thesis. It is based on the results from the model build 
to value Autostrade and its purposes were mainly two. The first one, to conduct an independent 
assessment by means of the outputs of a DCF model on the valuation changes suffered by 
Atlantia due to the risks of losing Autostrade concession rights. The second one, was to study 
the market shock reaction from a technical point of view.  
The chapter has been divided into 6 sub-chapters detailed below:  
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1. In the first part there is a review on valuation topics of interests and corporate valuation 
theory. This seeks to provide to the reader with the basics on how the DCF model was 
built. In addition, the main problem the authors aim to solve for valuation practitioners 
is presented. In short, the question to be answered is how under such an event, the 
valuation changes are explained by changes in cash flows vs changes in WACC. 
2. The second presents the logic followed to conduct the study. Three different valuations 
of Autostrade were done. One before the collapse, which is known as the Base Case. A 
second one just right after the collapse, which considers the views that created the shock. 
Finally, a third one, as of 6 months from the event, considering the information available 
by end of February 2019. 
3. Sub-chapters 3, 4 and 5 present the results obtained from the valuations. Business plans 
of Autostrade in each case were updated according to the information available, which 
modified the cash flows of Autostrade. The WACC attributable to Autostrade was 
computed proportionally to the Equity Value that the interest in Autostrade represented 
in Atlantia’s market capitalization, according to the consensus from the Broker Reports. 
4. The last point studies the outputs found from the analysis, with emphasis on cash flows 





is presented. The 
authors propose it as a way to assess, from a pragmatic point of view for practitioners, 
changes in enterprise value derived from events of similar nature.  
Finally, Chapter 5 outlines the main conclusions derived from the case study. The authors also 
present additional research of interest that could be conducted on the topic and that fell outside 
the scope of the presented work.  
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Chapter 2. Analysis of ASPI’s valuation: impact derived 
from the collapse 
The aim of this chapter is to study how the valuation fundamentals change when valuing a 
company under such an event like the collapse of the Genoa Bridge. At the same time, to remark 
the distribution of risk through the FCF and the WACC as well as to develop a first multiple for 
future assessments of the impact in comparable disasters.  
The chapter is divided in 6 parts. In the first part, the authors present a brief theoretical review 
about changes in valuation fundamentals. In the second part, the authors explain the process 
used in order to assess Autostrade per l’Italia changes. In the third, fourth and fifth part, the 
authors explain the results obtained in each of the three cases under study. Finally, in the sixth 
and last part, the reader can find a discussion of the results obtained.  
 
2.1 Corporate valuation review and topics of interest derived from 
the collapse of the Morandi Bridge 
The determination of the value of a company is a challenge being faced by many working in the 
finance industry. 
Although applied in different contexts, bankers, asset managers, research analysts and investors, 
all need at some point to figure out what is the value of the assets hold by an enterprise to make 
rational decisions. The common way by which the enterprise value is defined is given by the 
following expression: 
 Enterprise Value=Market Value of Equity+Market Value of Debt   (1) 
Where,  
 Market Value of Net Debt=Market Value of Gross Debt-Cash & Market Securities   (2) 
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Despite the definition being clear, the word “Market” makes it difficult many times to estimate 
straightforward both parts, either because not all enterprises are public, or because of 
inefficiencies on the market which could conduct to wrong valuations. 
Two main approaches are currently being used by practitioners when trying to find the “true” 
value of the assets behind any company: 
1. Relative Valuation: which compares the asset valuation based on multiples of relevant 
metrics (i.e. PE ratio or EV/EBITDA) with those of other comparable company’s or 
versus the own historical valuation levels. 
2. Intrinsic Valuation: based on the economics of the company itself and not on its current 
price. In that case, the value of any asset, is defined as a function of the cash flows that 
it generates, the expected growth of those cash flows, the useful life, and its risk. 
This thesis is focused on Intrinsic Valuation methods, and, particularly, on the Discounted Cash 
Flow (DCF) method, being the one most commonly used in practice. According to the DCF, 
















    (3) 
Where, 
• FCF are operating Free Cash Flows to the firm available to all investors, prior to 
payments to bondholders but after reinvestment needs, and computed as: 
 FCF=EBIT (1-Tax Rate)+D&A- WC-Capex    (4) 
• CC is the expected Cost of Capital (CC) or return required by the investors, which 
reflects the firm’s business risk, in the sense that it is the cost of opportunity than an 
investor has by investing in the firm’s assets and not doing it in another group of assets 
equally risky. 
• Terminal Value (TV) is the later set of cash flows (CF), assuming an infinite life. 
When building a DCF, the cash projections are estimated for a period in which the visibility of 
the Business Plan (BP) is realistic. Depending on the industry and type of firm, this period is 
going to vary largely, being the range typically between 5 to 10 years. For the remaining of the 
life, commonly projected to infinity, a Terminal Value (TV) is estimated. 
Such a TV, following the same logic as before, can be determined using Relative Valuation or 
Intrinsic Valuation methods. 
In Intrinsic Valuation, it is modeled as a perpetuity, using the last FCFT projected and assuming 
a constant growth rate g , estimated under certain assumptions, which many times need to be 












  (5) 
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In the case of a concessionaire business, applicable to this thesis, where the conditions are 
generally well specified by contract, (i.e. tariffs and timings set up a clear base to estimate 
revenues and to project its end), the TV is not used and FCF are projected until the expiration 
date. 
On the FCF part of the equation, assumptions on the business plan projections of the firm must 
be done. Either insiders of the company and or research analysts from the financing sector will 
estimate what will be the key drivers of the business according to its strategy and market available 
information. Such assumptions are going to largely impact the results, and several scenarios and 
sensitivities on this, should be conducted. As an example, in the case of a toll road, traffic 
projections will be key to determine the volumes that will flow. From the number of users, we 
will find how much revenues the concession will be able to generate, based on the tariffs agreed. 
Regarding the Cost of Capital to be used as a discounting rate, its determination has been linked 
commonly with the basis of modern financial theory. The 2 main ones used in a DCF are the 
Modigliani and Miller (MM) theory (1963) and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM - 1959). 
On one hand, MM were awarded a Nobel Prize in Economics for pointing out that capital 
structure does not affect the value of the firm in perfect market conditions. On the other, Sharpe, 
Markowitz and Merton Miller jointly received a Nobel Memorial Price in Economics as well, for 
building a model which could describe the relationship between systematic risk (i.e. the 
uncertainties inherent to the entire market) and expected return for assets, particularly stocks. 
A lot of research and effort in trying to proof and empirically test both theories have been 
conducted since its inception.  
Commonly, proofs were based on the impossibility of arbitration and, thus, assuming perfect 
financial markets, being always right, which do not include the costs of bankruptcy (going-on 
concern) either the impact on taxes. However, the limitations on the real practice of such 
assumptions are evident and cast doubt on its applicability in corporate valuation techniques. 
As a response, models which aim to be an evolution off the abomination original investigations 
had been developed and empirically validated. As an example, the empirical check for trade-off 
(the benefits derived from the tax-shield on debt) and the pecking order theory (how the cost of 
financing increases with asymmetric information) in the view of capital structure done by Fama 
and French (2002), or the stochastic modeling proposed by Strebulaev (2007), based on 
modelling a random change of the enterprise value and then changing capital structure for better. 
Overall, consensus has not been reached, and the reality is that in common practice, many times 
sensitivities on the results play a much important role rather than the validity of the theory 
sustaining the methods used. In part, because the assumptions taken when building financial 
models are already more significant rather than the degree of validity of the theory itself. 
As of today, and using the original MM and CAPM framework, the CC can be estimated by 
means of the Weighed Average Cost of Capital or WACC , defined as: 
 WACC = r (1 )D C E
D E
t r
D E D E
 −  + 
+ +
  (6) 
Where: 
Chapter 2. Analysis of ASPI’s valuation: impact derived from the collapse HEC Paris 
 
P. Ajenjo Puigderrajols (2019)  10 
•  rD  is the pre-tax market expected yield to maturity on long-term debt. 
•  Ct  is the corporate marginal tax rate. 
• D is the market value of long-term debt. 
• E  is the market value of equity. 
•  Er  is the market expected return on equity. 
Following the MM theory, in perfect financial markets, if the capital structure of a firm does not 
have an impact on its future cash flows, then, both sides of the balance sheet should reflect the 
same and: 
 Risk of Business Assets=Risk of Liabilities & SHL's Equity   (7) 
Which justifies the use of the rates of return required by equity holders and debt holders as the 
same risks associated with the FCF that the firm can generate, i.e. the business risk. 
Despite the formula being explicit, the word “Market” makes difficult the estimation of the 
parameters that should determine the value of WACC. 
There are 3 main things that need to be estimated/adjusted which are discussed below: 
1. Target Capital Structure (E and D) 
The long-term capital structure target of the company should be the reference to be used as 
weights for the split among debtholders and shareholders’ claims. 
To do that, it is necessary to estimate the current capital structure based on market values of 
equity and debt and adjust it for any expected changes on management’s financing philosophy 
in the future.  
Market values will be easy to find in the case of securities marked to market (i.e. common stock, 
bonds etc..), but will require adjustments for items which are not, such as operating leases, 
minority interests and other book value assets not updated to the present conditions. 
Additionally, benchmarking with other comparable companies will allow to understand better 
the results obtained. And, to check if the capital structure of today is something temporary due 
to ongoing changes or if there is any permanent difference with the peers.  
The benchmark on comparable listed entities is key when we need to value private corporates. 
Market values on the equity and debt are not straightforward and using comparables is the best 
alternative used by practitioners. 
2. Market Cost of Debt (r )D  
The approach to estimate the cost of debt consist in 3 steps: 
• Firstly, to determine the bond rating of the debt. If the entity has bonds on the market, 
credit rating agencies will most probably provide this information. Otherwise, to 
benchmark with bonds and leverage ratios from comparable entities is the best 
alternative to use. 
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• Next, to find what is the yield spread that the market requires for corporate bonds of 
entities which have the same credit rating as the one of the corporate. Finally, add to it 
the 30-year government bond yield asked by the market. 
• Thirdly, because interest payments provide tax deductions, it is necessary to convert the 
bond yields to an after-tax yield. Not doing it, considering the definition of FCF given 
in equation 4, would represent an underestimation of the FCF.  
 
3. Market Cost of Equity (r )E  
The determination of the cost of equity takes as a reference the CAPM, and is defined as: 
 r ( )E f E m fr r r= +  −   (8) 
Where: 
• fr  is the risk-free rate, normally it is taken as the yield on the 10-y or 30-y Treasury bond 
from the market (i.e. in North America is USA; in Europe is Germany).  
• In the case of  a concession, when visibility to the end is provided, the best is to match 
the time of  maturity of  the security with the date of  expiration of  the concession. 
• ( )m fr r−  is the market Risk Premium, usually taken as the average of  excess returns of  
equity compared to treasury bonds in a reasonable period of  time, which will be able to 
smooth effects of  economic cycles. Values between 6-8% are commonly used. 
• E is the measure of  exposure of  the company or group of  assets to the market risk, 
and is estimated as a time-series regression of  Er and mr : 
 
2






=   (9) 
Where: 
• 2m is the variance of  the market returns (i.e. the volatility of  the market) 
In order to estimate the E of  a firm, either listed or not listed, many practitioners do not run 
the regressions themselves, but look at the consensus of  the market provided by analysis of  
broker reports on the company and among its comparables. 
It is common to look for betas of  comparable firms in the industry and take the average among 
them. 
However, the riskiness of  equity is closely linked with the leverage that a firm has, because of  
the higher priority that debtholders have over shareholders in the case of  bankruptcy (i.e. cash 
flows generated will first serve debtholders, thus, the higher the leverage, the higher the risks 
and the higher the beta of  the equity). 
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Leverage is an effect that must be removed from comparable companies to determine the beta 
of  the assets of  the firms before averaging them. Finally, the value obtained, must be releveled 
using the capital structure of  the company under study. 
Therefore, following the same reasoning presented on equation 6 on the right side of  the balance 
sheet, we could define the A  of  a firm as the sum of  the contributions of  a D  on debt and 
of  a E  on equity as follows: 
 (1 )A D C E
D E
t
D E D E
  =  −  + 
+ +
  (10) 
Which should be equivalent to the beta from the asset side:  
 A U U TS CV D t  =  +     (11) 
Considering the value split in the form of  an unlevered firm UV , plus an additional contribution 
attributable to the tax-shield effects on debt, that have a value of CD t . 
To determine the U as a combination of  equation 10 and 11, assumptions are taken.  
If  it is assumed that a firm targets or has a fixed leverage ratio, and that debt is riskless, it can be 
proved that the TS U = and the 0D = .  
In that case, the level of  debt will fluctuate with the value of  the firm, and, consequently, the 








  (12) 
On the other hand, if it is assumed that a firm will aim to keep a constant level of debt, then 











  (13) 
Experience says that the differences observed in using one or other method are not significant, 
nevertheless, equation 13, known as Hamada’s Equation (Robert Hamada, 1972) has imposed 
its dominance on finance practitioners worldwide. 
The objective of  this subchapter 4.1 aims to show that the theory behind building a DCF is not 
an exact science, and it involves many assumptions derived from the limitations of  the models 
developed in financial theory, and, particularly, on the estimations of  WACC. 
This brings uncertainty with regards the validity of  the EV derived from financial models, but, 
as of  today, and from a pragmatic perspective, there is no better alternative, and the DCF is used 
and trusted by many practitioners in finance. 
Chapter 2. Analysis of ASPI’s valuation: impact derived from the collapse HEC Paris 
 
P. Ajenjo Puigderrajols (2019)  13 
Remembering the case of  the collapse of  the bridge, it created a market shock for Atlantia that 
has its interest to be studied further.  
The Equity Value (and so the EV) was severely affected in a very short period due to the 
uncertainties of  the consequences with regards to Autostrade per l’Italia’s future hands. 
Thus, the main goal, will be to empirically study this event, putting emphasis on how the market 
reaction took place, applying the DCF methodology, and developing some metrics that could be 
of  usefulness in assessing the impacts of  potential future shocks in corporations when modeling 
scenarios. 
To develop further on the mentioned above, after the shock of  the collapse of  the bridge, the 
EV of  Atlantia, computed by means of  a DCF, was lowered by the two main components 
presented in equation 3: 
1. The FCF contribution of  Autostrade to Atlantia became not clear anymore.  
2. The risk of  the business assets increased. Primarily, the cost of  debt was expected to be 
higher due to a lower on the credit rating, next, the beta was also affected because of  the 
higher volatility that the shock brought to the market. 
Understanding how those two factors impacted the EV changes in the shock, based on market 
information at a given time, is of  usefulness for practitioners to be able to simulate future crashes 
in a very pragmatic way, as will be presented on the following chapter. 
Particularly, the event sets up an ideal framework to know how much weight FCF had on 
valuation changes compared with the changes attributable to the WACC just right after the event, 
and how did evolved later in time, as more information was made available. 
In fact, previous research, conducted by Cochrane (2011) proved that price volatility was largely 
depending on discount rates volatility rather than on the volatility of  cash flows. However, the 
results were determined for stock exchange indexes and over long periods of  time, which cast 
doubt on the general applicability. The collapse of  the Morandi Bridge is a good example to test 
whether such a theory can be extended further to extreme events as well. 
 
2.2 Description of the methodology 
As described previously, this chapter is centered in the impact that the collapse of the Genoa 
bridge has had in Autostrade per l’Italia valuation fundamentals. These valuation fundamentals 
can be classified primarily in (i) the Free Cash Flows (FCF) and (ii) the WACC of the company 
which in aggregate give place to the valuation of Autostrade.  
In order to capture how both the FCF and the WACC have changed due to the collapse, the 
authors have first considered a Base Case which reflects the value of Autostrade before the 
collapse.  
In this way, the authors have been able to calibrate the intrinsic valuation of the company as well 
as to obtain values of reference for both, the FCF and the WACC, without the implications that 
the collapse had.   
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Once the authors had a first valuation of reference, two more have been calculated: a short-term 
valuation (Short-term Case) and a medium-term valuation (Medium-term Case).  
Both cases are after the collapse of Genoa bridge so, they incorporate the information that the 
company was publishing at that time, as well as the market beliefs regarding the concession (i.e. 
the regulatory risk). Note that by having two cases after the collapse the authors are able to study 
two effects: the effect of time and the effect that the disclosure of information has in the 
valuation fundamentals.  
Once the three business plans are projected, the authors can obtain information regarding the 
evolution of how valuation fundamentals evolve over time, and more important, an 
approximation of how changes in valuation are distributed between changes in FCF and changes 
in WACC.   
For ease of clarity, see below a timeline of the different cases vs the performance of both, the 
volume and the stock price of Atlantia.  
 
Figure 2.1 Stock price volume chart of ATL (ticker: ATL.MI). Source: Atlantia, 2019. 
Remember that Autostrade is currently a subsidiary of Atlantia, and a private company, which 
means that valuation changes in Autostrade are not directly public. But it is done in an indirect 
way through Atlantia share price. This is an important point since in order to adjust the different 
valuations the authors needed to calculate through broker consensus the Autostrade’s relative 
weight in the equity value of Atlantia. This point will be covered in more detail in the next 
subchapters.  
 
2.3 Base Case scenario 
The Base Case is dated the day before the collapse, so, August 13th, 2018. Thus, the case does 
not incorporate any of the impacts or potential impacts that the event caused. What incorporates 
is the latest financials that Autostrade disclosed before the event, which are the ones concerning 
6M 2018 (period end June 30, 2018).  
The authors valued Autostrade projecting in a very detailed way the different sub-concessions 
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In order to do so, it has been used Broker Reports1, Sector Reports, Autostrade’s concession 
agreements and its variations, news, disclosed financials and data bases, among others. A detailed 
guide on how the authors projected Autostrade can be found on Appendix 6.  
Once Autostrade per l’Italia is projected, which implies that the distribution of the FCF is 
obtained, the authors calculated the WACC at that moment by adjusting the DCF according 
with the proportion of Equity Value that the interest in Autostrade represents in Atlantia Market 
Value, according to Broker Reports. Under the Base Case, the Equity Value (EqV) of Autostrade 
represents 66.3% of the total Market Value of Equity of Atlantia at that date (see Table 4.1).  
 
Table 2.1 Proportion of Equity Value that represents ASPI over the market value of ATL as of August 13th, 2018. 
Source: Broker Reports. 
With this proportion and the projections in mind, the authors obtained a WACC as of August 
13th, 2018 of 5.9%. However, this WACC is not Atlantia’s WACC, but the WACC of Autostrade 
per l’Italia since the valuation is done in a standalone way.  
This also implies that from now onwards, changes in the Market Value of Equity represent direct 
changes in the valuation of Autostrade since the other Atlantia’s divisions are considered to not 
have a considerable impact during the period in study. This is a strong assumption taken under 
this study.  
See below Autostrade’s valuation what does this WACC under the Base Case scenario imply:  
                                                          
1 Brokers Reports used: RBC Capital Markets, Equita, Banco Santander, Société Générale, J.P. Morgan Cazenove, 




RBC Capital Markets 23/05/2018 80.3%
Societe Generale 24/05/2018 64.2%
J.P. Morgan 06/06/2018 N/A
UBS 08/06/2018 65.0%
Macquarie Research 13/07/2018 N/A
Banco Santander 24/07/2018 59.2%
Equita 06/08/2018 62.9%
Average Base Case 66.3%
Broker Date
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Figure 2.2 Valuation of ASPI under the Business Plan of the Base Case. Source: own source. 
Note that both, the valuation as well as the WACC obtained in this case are in line with market 
beliefs which under such a private company, could be considered to be the aggregate of the 
Broker Reports’ opinion.  
Since in the next scenarios (short and medium-term), the model will be modified in order to 
incorporate the impact of the fall of Genoa Bridge, the authors considered of interest to run 
sensitivities in the model. 
 For your reference, see below a figure which provides information regarding the main 
sensitivities of the Business Plan. Note that since it is a toll road operator, the item that has more 
impact on the valuation is the GDP growth because all the traffic growth is linked to GDP, 
using traffic multipliers (econometric model of 1 independent variable). 
 
Figure 2.3 Valuation sensitivities. Source: own source. 




Investments accounted for at cost or fair value 44
Investments accounted for using the equity method 26
Equity attributable to non-controlling interests 346
Non-current portion of provisions for construction services required by contract 2,531
Non-current provisions 1,269
Current portion of provisions for construction services required by contract 641
Current provisions 217
Equity Value (100%) 15,478
% stake 88.1%
Equity Value associated to ATL 13,630
Number of shares in issue (m) 826
Price per share associated to ATL (€/share) 16.5
Price per share ATL 13/08/18 24.9
% ASPI/ATL 66.3%
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2.4 Short-term reaction after the collapse 
The Short-term Case tries to include all the market beliefs that investors had due to the collapse 
of the bridge and to calculate how fundamentals changed. These reactions have already been 
covered in previous chapters of this thesis but, in order to summarize them in a more practical 
way, the authors aggregated how Brokers updated their Autostrade per l’italia models (as an 
immediate reaction to the fall).  
These reactions could be considered as the reactions under a market efficient environment since 
they reflect news, press releases and other ways of information from both, the company (Atlantia 
or Autostrade per l’Italia) and the Government.  
See below the short-term reactions to the fall of the Genoa Bridge, both the facts from Atlantia 
(that by that time it did not disclosed anything) and the market beliefs represented by the 
Brokers’ opinion:  
 
Table 2.2 Impacts due to the collapse of Genoa Bridge: facts from ATL vs Market beliefs (short-term reaction 
from Broker Reports). Source: Broker Reports, News and Financial Reports. 
As you can see in the above table, the main market beliefs were: 
• Provisions: estimated to be in average €750m. According to Atlantia at that time, it was 
insured against such events. However, according to Broker Reports it was ultimately 
responsible for maintenance and any negligence could avoid this insurance. The total 
€750m value is composed of the fine suggested by Danilo Toninelli, Minister of 
Infrastructure, the estimated cost to rebuild the bridge and additional compensatory 
damages. 
• Time for reconstruction of the Genoa Bridge.  
• Increase in Autostrade’s maintenance OPEX since the beliefs were that all bridges in 
Italy may be subject to immediate inspection and maintenance.  
• Traffic impact: the general belief was that the traffic would be impacted because the A10 
was a feeder road for several other motorways and the rebuild would take an average of 
2 years. In addition, additional inspections could decrease the traffic in Italy.  




Total provisions (including Genoa bridge 
provision)
N/A €500m €750m €1bn
Time for reconstruction of Genoa bridge N/A 8 months 2 years 3 years
ASPI's maintenance opex N/A
c.30% increase until 
2025
c.40% increase until 
2025




ASPI's extension due to the Bypass project N/A
Updates regarding the FCF of ASPI
Market beliefs
Facts from ATL
2% downside forecasts for the period 2018-21
ASPI extension seems more difficult
N/A
Chapter 2. Analysis of ASPI’s valuation: impact derived from the collapse HEC Paris 
 
P. Ajenjo Puigderrajols (2019)  18 
• Autostrade’s extension due to the Bypass project: according to Broker Reports, the 
aggregate opinion was that due to the conflict with the Government, the extension could 
be delayed further or even canceled.  
The Short-term Case has been constructed from the Base-Case by applying these modifications 
in the Business Plan.  
Once the new FCF were projected, and similarly as it was done in the Base Case, the WACC has 
been obtained by adjusting the DCF with the proportion of Equity Value that the interest in 
Autostrade per l’Italia represents in Atlantia Market Value.  
Under the Short-term Case, the Equity Value (EqV) of Autostrade per l’Italia represents 53.6% 
of the total Market Value of Equity of Atlantia at that date (see Table 4.3). Note that, obviously 
the proportion at this time is lower than the one obtained in the Base Case.  
 
Table 2.3 Proportion of Equity Value that represents ASPI over the market value of ATL as of August 16th, 2018. 
Source: Broker Reports. 
With this proportion and the projections in mind, the authors obtained an Autostrade’s WACC 
as of August 16th, 2018 (the next day were markets were open after the fall of the bridge) of 6.6% 
(vs 5.9% in the Base-Case).  





RBC Capital Markets 14/08/2018 N/A
Equita 16/08/2018 54.9%
Macquarie Research 16/08/2018 52.0%
J.P. Morgan 21/08/2018 N/A
UBS 29/08/2018 58.0%
Banco Santander 05/09/2018 49.4%
Average Short-term Case 53.6%
Broker Date
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Figure 2.4 Valuation of ASPI under the Business Plan of the Short-term Case. Source: own source. 
It is worth to mention that Brokers (and investors) had a lot of difficulty to quantify the future 
Equity Value impact. Most of them changed its previous DCF or DDM valuations of Autostrade 
per l’Italia for scenarios analysis. However, the most common choice was to increase 
Autostrade’s WACC which now discounts an increased regulatory risk as well as all the 
uncertainties that are not incorporated in the FCF. That’s the reason why it increased by 0.7%.  
Autostrade’s valuation after the collapse was impacted mainly by the market beliefs of traffic 
decrease, since the model is highly sensible to this item. In the side of the FCF, it is also worth 
to estate the impact of the Autostrade’s extension due to the Bypass as well as the provisions.  
For more detail about how the different market beliefs regarding the FCF/WACC impacted the 
valuation of Autostrade’s attributable price per share, see Figure 4.5.  
 
Figure 2.5 Bridge of ASPI’s price per share associated to ATL (€/share): Base Case vs Short-term Case. Source: 
own source. 




Investments accounted for at cost or fair value 44
Investments accounted for using the equity method 26
Equity attributable to non-controlling interests 346
Non-current portion of provisions for construction services required by contract 2,531
Non-current provisions 1,269
Current portion of provisions for construction services required by contract 641
Current provisions 217
Total provisions (including Genoa bridge) 750
Equity Value (100%) 9,199
% stake 88.1%
Equity Value associated to ATL 8,101
Number of shares in issue (m) 826
Price per share associated to ATL (€/share) 9.8
Price per share ATL 16/08/18 18.3
% ASPI/ATL 53.6%





















Traffic impact ASPI's extension
due to Bypass
Time effect WACC Short-term Case
6.6% 
WACC
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2.5 Medium-term reaction after the collapse 
The Medium-term Case includes not only the market beliefs from investors (medium-term 
reaction) but also the facts from the company (and government) incorporated in both press 
releases as well as the financials of 9M 2018 (period end September 30, 2018). So, it could be 
seen as a way to study how the impact of reliable information during the process and time 
affected the valuation fundamentals of Autostrade per l’Italia.  
The reactions have already been covered in previous chapters of this thesis but, in order to 
summarize them in a more practical way, the authors aggregated how Broker updated their 
Autostrade’s models (as a medium-term reaction). 
These reactions could be considered as the reactions under a market efficient environment since 
they reflect news, press releases and other ways of information from both the company (Atlantia 
or Autostrade) and the Government.  
See below the medium-term reactions to the fall of the Genoa Bridge, both the facts from 
Atlantia and the market beliefs represented by the Brokers’ opinion:  
 
Table 2.4 Impacts due to the collapse of Genoa Bridge: facts from ATL vs Market beliefs (medium-term reaction 
from Broker Reports). Source: Broker Reports, News and Financial Reports. 
As you can see in the above table, the main facts and market beliefs were: 
• Genoa Bridge provision: Atlantia published 9M results, announcing it had booked a 
€350m provision associated with the potential reconstruction of the Polcevera Bridge 
and help the affected families in Genoa.  
• Time for reconstruction of Genoa Bridge: despite Brokers’ opinion that the timetable 
for the reconstruction of the bridge is ambitious, this is contractually a fact from Atlantia 
(announced late December 2018).  
• Extra provisions of Genoa Bridge: according to Brokers, the provision is exceptionally 
modest. That’s the reason why they included extra provisions in order to cover fines and 
other damages, among others.  
• Increase in Autostrade’s maintenance OPEX: estimates have been decreased with the 
new information provided.  
• Traffic impact: without changes.   
Minimum Average Maximum
Post-event (long-term reaction)
Genoa bridge provision €350m
Time for reconstruction of Genoa bridge 1 year
Extra provisions (fines and others) N/A €150m €200m €250m
ASPI's maintenance opex N/A
c.15% increase until 
2025
c.22.5% increase until 
2025




Freezing of ASPI's tariffs for 6 
months (1H19)
ASPI's extension due to the Bypass project N/A
Expected delays in the approval to lead to capex postponement (stand-
by situation). More visibility in capex rather than tariffs scheme
2% downside forecasts for the period 2018-21
Updates regarding the FCF of ASPI
Market beliefs
Facts from ATL
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• Tariff impact: Autostrade per l’Italia tariffs freeze for 1H19 which was announced on 
January 1, 2019.  
• Autostrade’s extension due to the Bypass project: after the collapse, the Italian 
Government received more pressure to approve the Genoa Bypass project. Since it has 
several budget constraints, which could make it difficult to manage this in case of a 
revocation of the concession, Brokers belief that this plan will be approved by the 
regulator next year as expected before the collapse.  
The Medium-term Case has been constructed from the Base-Case by applying these 
modifications in the Business Plan. Once projected the new FCF, and similarly as it was done in 
the Base Case, the WACC has been obtained by adjusting the DCF with the proportion of Equity 
Value that the interest in Autostrade represents in Atlantia Market Value.  
Under the Medium-term Case, the Equity Value (EqV) of Autostrade represents 58.7% of the 
total Market Value of Equity of Atlantia at that date (see Table 4.5). Note that, the proportion 
at this time is still lower than the one obtained in the Base Case.  
 
Table 2.5 Proportion of Equity Value that represents ASPI over the market value of ATL as of February 28th, 
2019. Source: Broker Reports. 
With this proportion and the projections in mind, the authors obtained an Autostrade’s WACC 
as of February 28th, 2019 of 6.3% (vs 5.9% in the Base-Case). See below Autostrade’s valuation 




Kepleur Cheuvreux 27/09/2018 N/A
Macquarie Research 12/11/2018 N/A
Banco Santander 21/01/2019 56.5%
Equita 07/02/2019 61.7%
Societe Generale 08/02/2019 60.6%
RBC Capital Markets 28/02/2019 56.0%
Average Medium-term Case 58.7%
Broker Date
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Figure 2.6 Valuation of ASPI under the Business Plan of the Medium-term Case. Source: own source. 
Despite the new financials, it is worth to mention that Brokers (and investors) still have a lot of 
difficulty to quantify the future Equity Value impact. However, it decreased 0.3% vs the Short-
term Case which means that certainty about the impact has improved.  
Autostrade’s medium-term valuation after the collapse was impacted mainly by the market 
beliefs of traffic too. In the side of the FCF it is also worth to mention the impact of the 
Autostrade’s tariffs freeze for 1H19.  
For more details about how the different market beliefs regarding the FCF/WACC impacted 
the valuation of Autostrade’s attributable price per share, see Figure 4.7.  
 
Figure 2.7 Bridge of ASPI’s price per share associated to ATL (€/share): Base Case vs Medium-term Case. 
Source: own source. 





Equity attributable to non-controlling interests 353
Non-current portion of provisions for construction services required by contract 2,338
Non-current provisions 1,269
Current portion of provisions for construction services required by contract 709
Current provisions 564
Extra provisions 200
Equity Value (100%) 11,652
% stake 88.1%
Equity Value associated to ATL 10,261
Number of shares in issue (m) 826
Price per share associated to ATL (€/share) 12.4
Price per share ATL 28/02/19 21.2
% ASPI/ATL 58.7%
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2.6 Discussion about the results 
As discussed in the introduction of  this chapter, understanding how the valuation fundamentals 
impacted the valuation in the shock, based on market information at a given time, is of  
usefulness for practitioners to be able to simulate future crashes in a very pragmatic way.  
Particularly, the event sets up an ideal framework to know how much weight FCF had on 
valuation changes compared with the changes attributable to the WACC just right after the event, 
and how did evolved later in time, as more information was made available. 








  (14) 
We are able to compare how percentual changes in FCF (relative to a base case), i.e. linked to a 
disaster, is able to explain changes in WACC.  
The results obtained in both, the Short-term Case and the Medium-term Case (showed in Figure 
4.8) demonstrate that in the case of  Autostrade per l’Italia its valuation change tends to be more 
guided by FCF changes. It is normal since the impact of  disasters like the fall of  the Genoa 
Bridge are well known by investors since the costs of  damages as well as externalities are 
commonly well projected.  
The results also show how the impact of  time and disclosure of  more information affects this 
multiple. The multiple in the Medium-term Case compared with the Short one is lower since the 
FCF projections, estimated in the Short-term Case, were largely exaggerated by investors. 
However, the impact on WACC was also exaggerated but it has recovered less compared with 
the FCF due to the still uncertainty regarding Autostrade’s concession.  
 
Figure 2.8 Relationship between the variation of FCF and WACC after the collapse of the Genoa Bridge. Source: 
own source. 
The authors included the Figures 4.9 and 4.10, in which the reader can see how the impact on 
FCF and WACC changed over time. It is of  relevance to see how uncertainty regarding valuation 
fundamentals affects more the WACC that the FCF.  
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Figure 2.9 Evolution of WACC vs time after the collapse of the Genoa Bridge. Source: own source. 
 
Figure 2.10 Evolution of FCF vs time after the collapse of the Genoa Bridge. Source: own source. 
The authors want to remark that the results regarding the calculation of  multiples should be 
seen in a critic way. These results are for Autostrade’s concession and the authors understand 
that the distribution of  FCF, the sector of  the company, as well as the specificity of  infrastructure 
assets ruled by agreements, among other things, can have an impact on them.   
Further research about the impact on this kind of  events is necessary in order to prove its 
applicability but, as a first and quick reference, these multiples could be used for assessing events 
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Chapter 3. Conclusions and further research 
This thesis presented a case study on the valuation changes and implications derived from the 
collapse of the Morandi bridge in Genoa that took place on the 14th of August 2018. Additionally, 
it provided a review on the takeover bid of Abertis leaded by Hochtief, ACS and Atlantia, and 
how the disaster impacted the M&A transaction which was not finalized by that time. 
The authors have worked to provide an answer to two questions and the main conclusions 
extracted from the research for each of them are presented below: 
1- What has been the impact of this event on the acquisition of Abertis for all the involved parties? 
The authors conclude that the impact on the M&A transaction that the collapse of the Morandi 
bridge has had as of end of March 2019 are very limited or even inexistent. 
The main points which supports this statement are outlined below: 
1. Abertis was acquired as it was primarily intended, the new Abertis Holdco was able to 
get appropriate financing, which took place in October 2018, post-collapse. 
2. The information facilitated by credit agencies, keeping the “BBB” level and improving 
the outlook, and the results reported by Atlantia, ACS and Hochtief, all indicate that the 
endurance of the conditions in debt terms from bank loans established to constitute the 
new Abertis Holdco was minor. 
3. Despite the crash that the accident supposed for Atlantia, the market reaction for ACS 
and Hochtief was not very strong. Moreover, stocks performed differently from Atlantia 
post-collapse. This indicates that there is a low correlation between the entities and that 
Abertis is seen as independent entity by the investor community. 
4. The refinancing operations conducted during the years 2018 and 2019 in Abertis 
Infraestructuras and in Abertis Holdco, considering the c.€3bn in notes placed in March 
2019, improved the cost of debt profile of Abertis and its owners, despite having a higher 
leverage and commitments upfront. 
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Nevertheless, time will tell if the outcomes of the investigations, and potential punishments in 
Atlantia, will change the conditions for getting future financing, despite the efforts made in 
presenting Abertis as an independent entity that have worked successfully to complete the 
transaction. 
2- How was the market reaction post-collapse and its evolution in time?   
The main conclusions extracted from the analysis on valuation changes of Atlantia’s market 
crash derived from the collapse of the Morandi bridge are: 
1.  The market over-reacted immediately after the shock. Investors were afraid of the 
removal of the concession of Autostrade that the government strongly reiterated in the 
first days, which explains the 30% stock price drop that occur immediately after the 
event. 
2. The government of Italy was the main driver of the over-reaction. Its statements were 
done without enough information regarding the viability of terminating the concession 
of Autostrade. Either legally, nor the economic impacts for the country were considered 
when the leaders of the political parties primarily commented on the issue, in an aim to 
calm down society. A good proof of that is how the situation has evolved as of March 
2019. On-going investigations to determine the degree of real culpability attributable to 
all parties, as well as the best way to proceed in order to minimize the costs derived for 
all are being studied.  
3. The stock price of Atlantia is still depressed, with additional risk attributed to it due to 
no visibility on what the final consequences will represent for them. Costs incurred as of 
end of March 2019 have been limited and provisioned by the company at c.€500m. 
Atlantia and Autostrade, both performed changes on its management structure aiming 
to bring confidence to the investment community and to its shareholders. Shareholders 
that reacted in an accordion mode, divesting at the time of the event and coming back 
to its original position 6 months later. 
4. The impact on enterprise value changes seen in Atlantia just right after the event (short-
term) was mainly attributable to the cash flows endangered from Autostrade. Cash flows 
explained 76% of the drop in the attributable share price of Atlantia, being traffic and 
penalties the two main contributors. WACC and risk perception, according to Broker 
consensus, represented 24% of the drop in the share price. When looking at the 
numbers, the FCF decreased by +25% and the WACC increased from 5.9% to 6.6%, 
which is a +11.9% in percentage terms. 
5. The impact on enterprise value seen in Atlantia 6-months post event (medium-term) is 
still mainly explained by the potential decrease on cash flows attributable to Autostrade. 
However, there has been a reduction on the weights. Cash flows explained the change 
in valuation by 67% while WACC has a weight of 33%. The WACC has been reduced 
slightly, from 6.6% to 6.3%. This proofs that, in the medium term, uncertainty on the 
outcome is valued more by the market as cash flow visibility impacts have improved 
considerably and are more tangible.  
6.  A new multiple establishing the relationship between cash flows and WACC has been 
determined for the event in 2 sequences of time. The multiple is expressed as: 
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. The authors propose this multiple as a source to predict future disasters of 
similar nature.  
To finalize, the authors would like to propose further research from the study that would be of 
interest for the academics and later directly applicable on the day to day of practitioners. 
From a corporate finance and valuation perspective, the authors suggest conducting empirical 





. Primarily, using data on similar events that 
occurred in the past, and filtering according to the industry.  
It is of logic to believe that the particularities of the concession terms governing Autostrade 
make cash flow projections rather straight forward while, in some other cases, risk perception 
could be higher and thus, the ratios applicability could be limited.  
In a second phase, it would be useful to determine in which specific areas practitioners could 
find such ratios an interesting tool to incorporate on its sensitivity analysis. The authors thoughts 
go towards project finance, for the infrastructure, energy and mining sectors.  
On the other hand, a benchmark on the financial implications observed in the thesis, versus the 
loss of welfare to society that the collapse of the Morandi bridge had could also be conducted. 
More specifically, the degree of fairness of the financial and reputational costs payed by Atlantia 
and the Italian political class, with the real impact that it had for society in an event which 
involved multiple deaths and damage to property and businesses from the city of Genoa should 
be determined. 
Also, this is linked with the complexities behind PPPs. The authors propose to put emphasis on 
the responsibility sharing clauses from the contracts established to determine certain 
recommendations on improving its effectiveness as a tool to finance infrastructure. This is of 
high importance in a moment where PPPs popularity is increasing in a global scale. 
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Appendix 1. Presentation of the main corporates 
A1.1 Abertis Infraestructuras 
Abertis Infraestructuras, S.A. (Abertis) is a Spanish Company, registered in Madird. The 98.7% 
of company shares are hold by Abertis Holdco, entity constituted the 29th of October 2018 on 
purpose and in a conjoint agreement for the voluntary takeover bid presented by Hochtief that 
took place in May 15th 2018. Their main shareholders are Atlantia (50% + 1 share), ACS (30%) 
and Hochtief (20% - 1 share), which reached an agreement on the control of the company in 
April 2018, ending with a complicated transaction which commenced in May 2017. 
Abertis main activity is in the toll road concession business. They build, maintain and operate 
highways in Europe, America and Asia, managing 8,648 km of roads with various concessions. 
They also provide electronic tolling, free-flow tolling and smart motility solutions from its 
subsidiaries, Emovis and Eurotoll. 
 
A1.2 Actividades de Construcción y Servicios 
Actividades de Construcción y Serivicios S.A. (ACS) is a Spanish limited entity. It is listed on the 
Spanish Stock Exchange, being part of the Ibex 35 index, and registered in Madrid Its main 
shareholder is the Chairman of the group, Mr. Florentino Pérez Rodríguez, whose ownership 
amounts to 12.7%. 
The company offers a diversified amount of services within the infrastructure space, which can 
be divided in 3 segments. Primary, they carry infrastructure development and residential 
construction works, building of new projects and construction of new mines. Secondly, they 
provide engineering, installation and maintenance services for industrial infrastructure in energy 
plants and communication installations. Finally, on the transportation side, the company offers 
traffic management services, concession services and management of public facilities. They 
operate in EMEA, Asia Pacific and America. 
 
A1.3 Atlantia 
Atlantia SpA (Atlantia) is an Italian holding company headquartered in Roma. Its shares trade 
publicly in the Milan stock exchange (MTA) under the name of ATL and are part of the FTSE 
MIB Index. Atlantia main shareholders are the Benetton family, with around 30% stake. 
Atlantia is a provider of infrastructure and construction services for motorways and airports with 
operations worldwide. The business can be segmented in 5 as follows: 
1- Italian motorways, focused on the construction and management of motorways operated 
under PPP in Italy, being its main subsidiary Autostrade per l’Italia SpA. 
2- International motorways, holding concessions in India, Poland, Brazil and Chile. 
3- Italian Airports, responsible of managing the two main airports of the country, Rome 
Fiumicino and Rome Ciampino. 
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4- International Airports, operating some other airport facilities such as Aeroports de la 
Cote d’Azur, in Nice (France). 
5- Other engineering, construction and traffic management solutions and services within 
the civil infrastructure field. 
 
A1.4 Autostrade per l’Italia 
Autostrade per l’Italia SpA (ASPI or Autostrade) is an Italian Company, with its operational 
headquarters registered in Roma. The company is managed and coordinated by Atlantia (88.06% 
ownership) and was established in 2003.  
The company main activities are the construction and management of toll highways in Italy, with 
a network of around 3,020 km across the country and 217 Service Areas. The main 
concessionaries of the group are Autostrade per l’Italia, Società Italiana per Azioni for the Mont 
Blanc Tunnel, Raccordo Autostradale Valle d’Aosta, Tangenziale di Napoli, Società Autostrade 
Meridionali and Autostrada Tierrenica SpA. 
Additionally, the group has some other entities offering additional services to the core business. 
Those include the management of service areas, payroll and general services for toll billing and 
cleaning services in outdoor areas and green areas. Overall, it is the main private investor of the 
country, providing service to 15 regions and connecting 60 provinces. Under its investment 
scheme, there are 1,066 km of highways to develop and improve until the end of its concessions.  
 
A1.5 Hochtief Aktiengesellschaft 
Hochtief Aktiengesellschaft (Hochtief) is a German limited company registered in the 
commercial register of the local court of Essen. Its corporate headquarters are in Germany.  
Currently, it is a subsidiary of ACS, which owns 50.15% (reduced from 71.72% after the 
acquisition of Abertis in October 2018). 
Hochtief is a building and infrastructure construction company involved in infrastructure 
projects, real estate and commercial facilities. They also provide concessions and operation 
services for infrastructure and renewable energy. The company operates in various countries in 
EMEA, Asia Pacific and the Americas. 
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Appendix 2. Autostrade per l’Italia concession legal 
framework and other information of interest 
In the following pages, an extraction of the terms and conditions governing Autostrade per 
l’Italia SpA concession, which are relevant for the financial impacts of the firm, are given. 
This information has been retrieved literally from the Offering Circular for the EMTN Program 
of Autostrade entered the 27th of October 2017. The specific pages were the text is found in 
each section will be given for ease of clarity. 
Business Description of the Group – Introduction- page 33 
“Autostrade Italia holds the Group’s primary concession (the “Autostrade Italia Concession”), which is 
governed by the concession agreement entered into on 12 October 2007 (the “Single Concession 
Contract”). 
The Single Concession Contract replaced a series of earlier agreements and implemented the regulatory provisions 
set out in Law Decree 262/2006, converted into Law 286/2006. 
The Autostrade Italia Concession and the other concessions for motorways in Italy (each, “Concession” and, 
collectively, the “Concessions”) held by subsidiaries of the Group (together with Autostrade Italia, the 
“Motorway Companies”) are granted by the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport (the “Concession 
Grantor”) as of 1 October 2012 pursuant to Law Decree 98 of 6 July 2011. Such concessions were previously 
granted by ANAS, a joint stock company owned by the Italian Ministry of Economics and Finance. 
Each Concession gives the relevant Motorway Company the right to finance, construct, operate and maintain its 
networks of motorways in Italy (the “Italian Group Network”) during the term of the Concessions. The 
Italian Group Network comprises 3,019 kilometres2 of motorways in Italy, of which the Autostrade Italia 
Concession (the “Autostrade Italia Network”) accounts for 2,855 kilometres or 95.0% of the Italian 
Group Network.  
Although the principal activities of the Group have always remained focused on the operation and 
maintenance of the Italian Group Network, in recent years the Group has diversified its business operations, both 
geographically and through expansion into other businesses related to the operation and management of 
motorways.” 
 
Table A2.1 Concessions held by ASPI’s Group as of December 31, 2017. Source: ASPI, 2017. 
 
 
Concessionaires % of issued capital km of network Concession expiry
Autostrade per l'Italia 100.0% 2,855 2038/2042
Società Italiana per il Traforo del Monte Bianco 51.0% 6 2050
Autostrada Tirrenica 100.0% 55 2038
Tangenziale di Napoli 100.0% 20 2037
Raccordo Autostradale Valle d'Aosta 24.5% 32 2032
Autostrade Meridionali 59.0% 52 2012
Total 3,020
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Business Description of the Group – Regulatory - pages 66-67 
“The Italian motorway sector is governed by a series of laws, ministerial decrees and resolutions by CIPE 
(Comitato Interministeriale per la Programmazione Economica), which have been issued and amended over time, 
as well as generally applicable laws and special legislation, such as the road traffic code. Motorway concessionaires 
must operate pursuant to this regulatory framework, as well as pursuant to the concession agreements entered into 
by the concessionaires and the Concession Grantor. 
The Italian Group Network is operated under five motorway Concessions granted by the MIT. As a result of 
Law Decree 98 of 6 July 2011, converted with amendments into Law 111/2011, certain policymaking, 
supervision and oversight functions previously exercised by ANAS, a joint-stock company owned by the Italian 
Ministry of Economics and Finance, which acted as Concession Grantor for Autostrade Italia until the effective 
date of such Law Decree n. 98/2011, were supposed to be transferred to a newly-established Roads and Highways 
Agency within the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport which would have assumed certain policymaking, 
supervision and oversight functions previously exercised by ANAS, as well as the role of grantor for existing 
motorway concessions, and administrator and grantor for any subsequent concessions put to public tender. 
However, since the required corporate documents were not approved by 30 September 2012, the Roads and 
Highways Agency was abolished and the responsibilities allocated to it were transferred to the Ministry of 
Infrastructure and Transport as of 1 October 2012 as Concession Grantor. 
ANAS will continue to: (i) build and operate toll public roads and motorways, including those reverted to State 
control as a result of the expiry or revocation of a relevant concession; (ii) perform upgrades and improvements of 
public roads and motorways and the road signs system; (iii) acquire, maintain and improve the tangible and 
intangible assets of the road and motorway network; (iv) provide traffic police services along the motorway network; 
and (v) approve projects relating to works on the non-toll road and motorway network which are of public interest. 
Law Decree 201/2011 (the so-called Salva-Italia, or “Save Italy”, legislation), converted, with amendments, 
into Law 214/2011, has set up the Transport Regulation Authority to oversee conditions of access and prices 
for rail, airport and port infrastructure and the related urban transport links to stations, airports and ports. This 
legislation was subsequently amended by article 36 of Law Decree 1/2012 (the so-called Liberalizzazioni, or 
“Deregulation”, legislation), extending the scope of the new regulator’s responsibilities to include the motorway 
sector. The new authority is, among other things, responsible for (i) determining tariff mechanisms based on the 
“price cap” mechanism for new concessions; (ii) deciding the concession schemes to be included in tenders for 
management and construction; (iii) defining the arrangements of tenders intended for motorway companies for new 
concessions; and (iv) determining the ideal management areas of motorway sections in order to promote a plural 
management of the sections and to enhance competition. 
Law Decree 1/2012, converted into Law 27/2012 (as amended by Law Decree 83/2012 converted into law, 
with amendments, by Law 134/2012), contains a range of provisions impacting, among other things, on 
motorway concessions, including (i) article 51, which, from 1 January 2014, has raised the minimum percentage 
of works to be contracted out to third-party contractors by the providers of construction services under concession to 
60%; and (ii) article 17, which has introduced a new regime for the holders of fuel service licences, who may now 
offer other goods and services for sale at their service stations. 
Article 177 of Legislative Decree no. 50 of 18 April 2016, concerning “concessionaire awarding”, has introduced 
the obligation to award to a third party 80% of the works, services and supply contracts for €150,000 or more, 
via public and open tender procedure for state or private entities which do not operate in the so called “excluded 
sectors” and which have been granted concessions as of the entry into force of the aforementioned Legislative Decree, 
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and which have not been subject to project financing or awarded through a public tender procedure in accordance 
with the European framework of rules. Furthermore, the above Legislative Decree provides that the remaining 
part (equal to 20%), in particular for private entities, can be carried out through companies directly or indirectly 
controlled or connected. 
Article 178 of Legislative Decree no. 50 of 18 April 2016, concerning motorway concessions and the interim 
regime, provides that the grantor of a motorway concession that has expired as of 19 April 2016, shall, within 6 
months from the date thereof, call a tender offer to award the concession. However, article 178 also provides that 
the grantor may operate the motorway in-house. In addition, article 178 (i) prohibits the extension of the term of 
concessions, (ii) provides that the operational risk set forth in article 3, paragraph.1, lett. zz), shall also include 
the “traffic risk” and (iii) provides that the former concessionaire will be entitled to receive from the new 
concessionaire an indemnity for investment made and not yet amortized, net of amortizations and certain assets. 
The new legislation, which repealed Legislative Decree no. 163 of 2006, entered into force on 20 April 2016 
and concessionaries shall implement the new provision within a transitional period (i.e. a period of 24 months 
from the date of entry into force). 
With regard to motorway service areas, the terms and conditions of sub-concession arrangements in force at 31 
January 2012 are unaffected, as are the restrictions linked to competitive tenders for motorway areas under 
concession, conducted in accordance with the format required by the Transport Regulation Authority.” 
 
Business Description of the Group – Important developments in the regulatory history 
of concessions- pages 69-71 
“Motorway concessions were historically granted by the State. In 1992, Law No. 498/92 granted CIPE the 
authority to issue directives in relation to the revision of existing motorway concessions and toll rates. CIPE, by a 
resolution dated 21 September 1993, established the criteria for the review and renewal of motorway concessions. 
Pursuant to such criteria, any bid must:  
(i) contain an investment plan (which provides estimates of the economic and financial performance of 
the concessionaire and includes the expected works to be performed by the concessionaire during the 
concession, the estimated cost of such works and expected State subsidies, if any) which is complying 
with a standard model approved by the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport and the Ministry 
of Economics and Finance; 
(ii) (ii) set out rules for the allocation of works according to applicable law in force, including EU 
environmental legislation; 
(iii)  (iii) broaden the concessionaire’s scope of activity, with the aim of improving its management and 
diversifying services offered to customers; and 
(iv) eliminate restrictions on the shareholding structure of the concessionaire companies. 
Since 1993, CIPE has issued several directives regarding the relationship between ANAS and the individual 
concessionaires, which form the basis for a standard concession agreement prepared by the Ministry of Infrastructure 
and Transport (the “Standard Concession Agreement”). The Standard Concession Agreement provided 
the general terms which were expected to govern subsequent concession agreements with the concessionaires. 
Regulatory changes were also introduced in the legal framework governing motorway concessions to delineate the 
roles of the State vis-à-vis the Italian regions. Italy’s regions, of which there are twenty, have administrative, 
legislative and executive powers at the local level, and can act in matters specifically under their domain or in areas 
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which are not specifically reserved for the State. Regions are responsible for managing the network of roads and 
motorways which do not have a national interest and may grant concessions for the construction and management 
of regional toll motorways. 
Law Decree No. 262 of 3 October 2006, which was enacted into law on 24 November 2006 as Law No. 
286/2006 (as subsequently amended, “Law 286/06”) and subsequently amended by Law No. 296/2006 
(“Law 296/06”) and by Law No. 101/2008, established a new regime for motorway concessions primarily 
through the requirement that concessionaires enter into a comprehensive new concession agreement following specific 
binding guidelines. All concessionaires are required to enter into such new concession agreement upon the earlier to 
occur of an update to the relevant concession’s financial plan (the “Concession’s Financial Plan”) or 
revision of the relevant concession agreement following the effectiveness of the new legislation. 
Law 286/06 provides, among other things, for: 
(i) the rate to be used in calculating annual tariff adjustments based on traffic and cost trends and the 
concessionaire’s efficiency and service quality; 
(ii) the terms for the allocation of additional profits generated by the commercial use of motorway 
areas; 
(iii) the terms for the recovery of toll revenues related to commitments under investment plans; 
(iv) the recognition of tariff adjustments in return for investments included in the investment plan only 
after the related investments have been verified by the grantor of the concession to have been effectively 
carried out; 
(v) the documentation to be provided to the Concession Grantor; and 
(vi) a system of sanctions and penalties in the event of a breach of the concession. 
New concession agreements are subject to the technical review by the Consulting Unit for the implementation and 
regulation of public utility services (Nucleo di consulenza per l’attuazione delle linee guida sulla regolazione dei 
servizi di pubblica utilità or “NARS”) as well as the CIPE, followed by a review by the relevant Parliamentary 
Commissions. New concession agreements are approved by interministerial decree from the Ministry of 
Infrastructure and Transport and the Ministry of Economy and Finance, subject to a preliminary review of 
legitimacy by the Corte dei Conti, the independent institute responsible for supervising public finances, among 
others. 
Law 286/06 and Law Decree 69/13, converted into Law 98/13, made substantial changes in the tariff 
adjustment procedure. In particular, Law 98/13, amending Law 286/06, provides that the concessionaire 
notifies the grantor, within 15 October of each year, a proposal containing the variations to the tariffs that it 
intends to apply, further to the investment item of parameters X and K regarding new additional works. 
By 15 December of each year, the Ministry of Infrastucture and Transport, in agreement with the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance, should enact a decree, approving or rejecting the proposed variations. The decree may 
concern exclusively the verifications regarding the accuracy of the values inserted in the revisioning formula and 
related calculations or the occurrence of severe violations of the provisions set forth in the concession and that have 
already been formally notified to the concessionaire by 30 June. 
In accordance with Law 286/06, CIPE issued a new directive in June 2007 (“Directive 39/07”) that 
introduced criteria and parameters for determining motorway tariffs. Directive 39/07 is applicable to all new 
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concessions and existing concessions where the concessionaire requests a re-alignment of the Concession’s Financial 
Plan, as well as to new investments under existing concessions which were not yet approved at 3 October 2006, 
or which were approved but not included in the investment plan at such date. Directive 39/07 introduced a new 
tariff formula which provides for a re-alignment of tariffs every five years to reflect traffic and cost trends and 
investment costs in an effort to provide the concessionaire with an agreed rate of return. Supplementing Directive 
39/07, CIPE Directive 27/2013 established criteria and methods for the updating of economic and financial 
plans at the expiry of the regulatory period. 
Law Decree 59/2008, converted into law by Law 101/2008, as amended, approved all concessions entered into 
with ANAS as of 31 July 2010 and enabled motorway concessionaires to agree to a simplified formula for the 
annual tariff rate adjustment calculation based, for the entire term of the concession, on a fixed percentage of real 
inflation, as well as terms for the return of invested capital. 
Law Decree 201/2011 (the so-called Salva-Italia or “Save Italy” legislation) also introduced a simplified 
approval procedure for amendments to existing concessions, which shall be approved by decree by the Ministry of 
Infrastructure and Transport, together with the Ministry of Economy and Finance. Updates or amendments to 
existing concessions which result in amendments to the investment plans or regulatory aspects relating to public 
finance, shall be reviewed by CIPE, following consultation with NARS which shall provide any comments within 
30 days.” 
 
Business Description of the Group – The Autostrade Italia Concession- pages 71-76 
“Legal Framework 
On 6 June 2008 the Italian Parliament passed Law No. 101/2008 which approved all the draft concession 
agreements with ANAS already executed by motorways concessionaires and, consequently, the Single Concession 
Contract entered into by Autostrade Italia and ANAS as Concession Grantor on 12 October 2007 in 
accordance with Law 286/06. The Single Concession Contract replaced the previous agreements between the 
parties relating to the Autostrade Italia Concession. Prior to the enactment of the Single Concession Contract, the 
Autostrade Italia Concession was governed by a concession agreement entered into with ANAS in 1997 (as 
subsequently amended, “Single Concession Contract”) and a series of supplementary addenda, the most 
significant of which was entered into in 2002 (the “2002 Supplementary Agreement”).  
The 2002 Supplementary Agreement approved a new investment plan at that time and introduced new criteria 
for determining some of the elements of the price-cap mechanism previously instituted to regulate tariff increases in 
order to compensate Autostrade Italia for the additional capital expenditure commitments undertaken at that 
time.  
 
Key Concession Terms 
The Single Concession Contract grants Autostrade Italia the right to continue to operate and manage the 
motorways and related infrastructure granted under the concession until 31 December 2038. 
The Single Concession Contract implemented (i) a new formula for tariff adjustments; (ii) new detailed rules on 
Autostrade Italia’s rights and obligations; and (iii) a revised investment plan. The investment plan and tariff 
formula are set forth in more detail below. 
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Autostrade Italia’s Obligations 
In particular, Autostrade Italia’s main obligations include the duty: 
(i) to manage and maintain the motorway infrastructure; 
(ii) to organise, maintain and promote motorist assistance services; 
(iii) to design and execute works specified in the Single Concession Contract, such as the construction of 
additional lanes and motorway sections and junctions; 
(iv) to keep detailed financial accounts, including traffic data, for each section of motorway; 
(v) include a clause in the by-laws of Autostrade Italia requiring that its Board of Statutory Auditors 
include an officer of the Concession Grantor; 
(vi) to maintain a debt service coverage ratio (“DSCR”) throughout the period of the applicable 
concession; 
(vii) for activities directly connected to the construction and maintenance of highways (not including 
activities already specified in the Single Concession Contract), to grant works, services and supplies in 
accordance with existing laws and regulations; 
(viii) to reserve, on an annual basis, a portion of shareholders’ equity in an amount equal to the net 
benefits it has received from delays in investments that are not compensated through tariffs (such as those 
under the Single Concession Contract), until such time as the originally planned investment amounts 
have been made; 
(ix) to have available irrevocable financing or cash or cash equivalents committed to investment funding 
in an amount equal to the investment gap (the difference between planned and realised investments) with 
respect to a particular investment plan; 
 (x) not to provide financing to or guarantees for entities that are controlling, controlled by, otherwise 
under common control or affiliated with Autostrade Italia pursuant to Article 2359 of the Italian Civil 
Code, except for subsidiaries of affiliated companies operating in roadway infrastructure or in order to 
enable larger capital raising at more favourable terms; and 
(xi) to establish and maintain procedures to prevent conflicts of interests and independence requirements 
for the members of its board of directors. 
In addition, the entity controlling Autostrade Italia shall be required, for the duration of the Single Concession 
Contract, to maintain a net worth of at least €10 million for every percentage point of share capital of Autostrade 
Italia held by it, and shall maintain its registered office in a white-list country and ensure that the offices and 
management of Autostrade Italia are located in Italy. 
The Single Concession Contract sets forth the sanctions and penalties applicable in the event of violations of the 
obligations set forth above. Penalties vary from €10,000 to €2 million. Sanctions vary from €25,000 to €5 
million. The highest fine is imposed in connection with a failure to obtain prior authorisation by the Concession 
Grantor of extraordinary transaction. The maximum aggregate annual amount of such sanctions may not exceed 
10% of total annual revenue of Autostrade Italia, and in any case may not exceed €150 million per year. In the 
event that such amount is exceeded for two consecutive years, the Concession Grantor may propose the termination 
of the concession to the relevant Ministries. 
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Concession Payments 
Under the Single Concession Contract, in accordance with Law 296/06, Autostrade Italia is required to pay 
an annual fee equal to 2.4% of net toll revenue (net of VAT and the Additional Concession Fees) and 5.0% of 
the revenues derived from any subconcessions or subcontracts, including fees related to the commercial use of the 
telecommunications networks, which annual fee on subconcessions or subcontracts increases to 20.0% for new 
services coming into existence after 8 June 2008 or which relate to services in new service areas. 
 
Expiry or Termination of Concession 
Upon the expiry of the Single Concession Contract, Autostrade Italia is required to transfer to the Concession 
Grantor the motorways and related infrastructure without compensation and in a good state of repair. 
The Single Concession Contract sets out procedures for early termination of the concession in the event of material 
and continuing non-performance by Autostrade Italia of the material terms of the concession. 
Similarly, the concession is subject to early termination by Autostrade Italia in the event of non-performance by 
the Concession Grantor or material changes in the legal framework of the concession. In the event of early 
termination of the Autostrade Italia Concession, the Concession Grantor would step into the shoes of Autostrade 
Italia, assuming all its obligations and receiving all of its benefits under the Autostrade Italia Concession. 
In return, Autostrade Italia is entitled to receive a cash payment based on the net present value, discounted at 
market rate, of revenues from operation until the end of the term of the concession, net of projected costs, liabilities, 
investments and projected taxes for such period, plus taxes due payable by the concessionaire following receipt of 
such indemnification amount by the Concession Grantor, less (i) the outstanding financial debt assumed by the 
Concession Grantor at the date of transfer from Autostrade Italia, (ii) and projected cash flows from ordinary 
business until the end of the term of the concession. 
In the event that the early termination is due to Autostrade Italia’s failure to meet its obligations, such payment 
is reduced by 10.0% plus any damages. In the event of termination of the Single Concession Contract for reasons 
other than the failure by Autostrade Italia to fulfil its obligations, such penalty shall not apply. 
In the event that the Concession Grantor finds material and continuing non-performance by Autostrade Italia of 
material terms of the concession, it must issue a notice to Autostrade Italia requiring it to rectify such non-
performance within a specified and reasonable timeframe or provide the reasons for the non-performance. 
If the reasons provided are not acceptable or the non-performance is not rectified within the specified timeframe, 
then the Concession Grantor may, following confirmation of the continuing material breach, commence proceedings 
to terminate the concession. Such proceedings are a preliminary phase in which Autostrade Italia is given notice 
of the breach and formally requested to cure the breach within a set time period, which cannot be less than 90 
days. During this time, Autostrade Italia can present its position and objections. At the end of such time period, 
if the breach continues or in the event that the Concession Grantor rejects the concessionaire’s objections, the 
Concession Grantor is required to set out another time period of not less than 60 days within which the 
concessionaire must cure the breach. If Autostrade Italia does not cure the breach within this 60 day period, the 
Concession Grantor may, jointly with the Ministry of Economy and Finance, issue a decree declaring the 
termination of the concession. In such an event, the concessionaire is obliged to continue managing the concession 
until management of the concession is transferred. 
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Investments and Cost Overruns 
For project investments of the other Motorway Companies, the relevant Motorway Subsidiary assumes the 
obligation to pay cost overruns necessary to complete the committed investments. 
Pursuant to Law 286/06 and Directive 39/07, the other Motorway Companies (except for Società Italiana 
per Azioni per il Traforo del Monte Bianco) have entered into “realignment/rebalancing” concession, which 
provides for a realignment of tariffs every five years to reflect investment costs. Such Motorway Companies have 
therefore assumed the obligation to finance cost overruns only in excess of the Approved Investment Amount, with 
the exception of cost overruns due to force majeure or resulting from acts by third parties.” 
 
Terms and Conditions of the Notes – Redemption, Purchase and Options- page 105-106 
“(e) Redemption at the Option of Noteholders on the Occurrence of a Put Event 
If, at any time while any of the Notes remains outstanding (as defined in the Trust Deed), a Put Event (as 
defined below) occurs, then, unless at any time the Issuer shall have given a notice under Condition 6(d) in respect 
of the Notes, in each case expiring prior to the Put Date (as defined below), each Noteholder will, upon the giving 
of a Put Event Notice (as defined below), have the option to require the Issuer to redeem any Notes it holds on 
the Put Date at their principal amount, together with interest accrued up to, but excluding, the Put Date. 
For the purposes of this Condition 6(e): 
A “Put Event” occurs if: 
(i) the Autostrade Italia Concession or the Single Concession Contract is terminated or 
revoked in accordance with its terms or for public interest reasons; or 
(ii) a ministerial decree has been enacted granting to another person the Autostrade Italia 
Concession; or 
(iii) it becomes unlawful for Autostrade Italia to perform any of the material terms of the 
Autostrade Italia Concession; or 
(iv) the Autostrade Italia Concession is declared by the competent authority to cease 
before the Maturity Date (as defined in the applicable Final Terms); or 
(v) the Autostrade Italia Concession ceases to be held by Autostrade Italia or any 
successor resulting from a Permitted Reorganisation; or 
(vi) the Autostrade Italia Concession is amended in a way which has a Material Adverse 
Effect (as defined in Condition 10 below). 
 
Promptly upon becoming aware that a Put Event has occurred, and in any event not later than 21 days after the 
occurrence of the Put Event, the Issuer shall give notice (a “Put Event Notice”) to the Noteholders in 
accordance with Condition 17, specifying the nature of the Put Event and the procedure for exercising the option 
contained in this Condition 6(e). 
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To exercise the option to require the Issuer to redeem a Note under this Condition 6(e), the Noteholder must 
deliver such Note at the specified office of any Paying Agent, on any day which is a day on which banks are open 
for business in London and in the place of the specified office falling within the period (the “Put Period”) of 45 
days after the date on which a Put Event Notice is given, accompanied by a duly signed and completed Exercise 
Notice in the form available from each office of the Paying Agents (the “Exercise Notice”). 
The Note must be delivered to the Paying Agent together with all Coupons, if any, appertaining thereto maturing 
after the date (the “Put Date”) being the seventh day after the date of expiry of the Put Period, failing which 
deduction in respect of such missing unmatured Coupons shall be made in accordance with Condition 7(e). The 
Paying Agent to which such Note and Exercise Notice are delivered will issue to the Noteholder concerned a non-
transferable receipt (a “Put Option Receipt”) in respect of the Note so delivered. 
Payment by the Issuer in respect of any Note so delivered shall be made, if the holder duly specified in the Exercise 
Notice a bank account to which payment is to be made, by transfer to that bank account on the Put Date, and 
in every other case, on or after the Put Date against presentation and surrender of such Put Option Receipt at the 
specified office of any Paying Agent. An Exercise Notice, once given, shall be irrevocable. For the purposes of 
these Conditions and the Trust Deed, Put Option Receipts issued pursuant to this Condition 6(e) shall be treated 
as if they were Notes. 
In the event that the Trustee has been notified by the Issuer that no further notes are outstanding under the Euro 
Medium Term Note Programme of Atlantia S.p.A., this Condition 6(e) shall be deemed to no longer be effective.” 
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Appendix 3. Assumptions and construction of the Business 
Plan 
The aim of this Appendix is to describe the main assumptions used in order to project the 
Business Plan of ASPI.  
The main sources of information in order to project it, were: Broker Reports2, Sector Reports, 
ASPI’s concession agreements and its variations, news, disclosed financials and data bases (IMF 
and Eikon Thomson Reuters mainly), among others.  
A3.1 Economics 
Economic projections have been taken from the IMF:  
 
Figure A3.1 GDP projections. Source: IMF, February 2018. 
 
Figure A3.2 CPI projections. Source: IMF, February 2018. 
                                                          
2 Brokers Reports used: RBC Capital Markets, Equita, Banco Santander, Société Générale, J.P. Morgan Cazenove, 
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A3.2 Traffic 
Using proprietary econometric analysis, the authors have been able to model historical ASPI 
traffic volumes3 (available data for the period 2012-17 in the annual reports). Based on regression 
analysis with fixed intercept at 0, the authors found that c.55% of the variation in annually ASPI 
traffic volumes can be explained by the annual evolution of Italian GDP (c.56% in ASPI’s 
subsidiaries), illustrating the importance of this variable for forecasting future traffic. In the case 
of regression analysis with variable intercept, the authors found that c.92% of the variation in 
annually ASPI traffic volumes can be explained by the annual evolution of Italian GDP (c.92% 
in ASPI’s subsidiaries).  
Note that, in the Base Case the projections were made with the results of the regressions with 
fixed intercept in order to avoid traffic growth with null GDP growth.  
 
Figure A3.3 a) ASPI regression analysis with fixed intercept b) ASPI’s subsidiaries regression analysis with fixed 
intercept. Source: ASPI’s annual reports, IMF. 
 
Figure A3.4 a) ASPI regression analysis without fixed intercept b) ASPI’s subsidiaries regression analysis without 
fixed intercept. Source: ASPI’s annual reports, IMF. 
 
A3.2 Tariffs 
Tariffs in the past have been typically by determined using the formula: 
                                                          
3 Traffic volumes in ATVD: aggregate theoretical vehicles per day, equal to number of kilometers travelling/journey 
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 70%T CPI X K =  + +   (15) 
The X factor recognized a tariff increase using a 7.2% real post-tax IRR capex under the 2002 
plan. The X factor lags investment by a year, and lasts for the duration of the concession. It will 
cease to contribute to tariffs once the investment is over (end of 2029).  
The factor K was based on a RAB-based system (( ) & ) / )RAB WACC D A traffic + , i.e. a 
system which provides a return on investment equivalent to the WACC (pre-tax before 
additional leverage) and is used for ASPI’s 2007 capex plan. The system remunerates capital 
employed at a fixed specific return. The regulatory periods run for five years. The current 
regulatory period runs until 2023, with a WACC 5.5% nominal post-tax.  
The old tariffs schemes are being replaced which should be NPV neutral. The old tariff formula 
is being replaced by: 
 100% 50T CPI bps =  +   (16) 
The concession will be extended by four years to 2042 (from 2038) and a terminal value 
equivalent to 1-1.5% of the final EBITDA will be payable to the company at expiry. Since the 
overall project remuneration should remain unchanged, and since the final conditions regarding 
the new tariff formula have not been approved, the authors considered to keep using the old 
tariff formula for the projections.  
 
Figure A3.5 Tariff increase projection segmented by components - ASPI. Source: ASPI concession agreement.  
Note that the subsidiary called Società Italiana per il Traforo del Monte Bianco has a difference 
tariff scheme ruled by the following formula: 
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Figure A3.6 Tariff increase projection segmented by components – Società Italiana per il traforo del Monte 
Bianco. Source: ASPI annual reports.  
A3.3 Revenues and EBITDA 
The authors estimate that ASPI revenues will have a long-term growth of 2.5% 2018-42E, i.e. 
tariffs will be the main driver of top-line growth as highlighted in Figure A6.7.  
The authors forecast EBITDA will rise from €2,568m in 2018E to €4,791m in 2042E, a CAGR 
of 2.6% - a forecast that hardly appears aggressive based on CPI projections.  
 
Figure A3.7 Drivers of growth in ASPI’s EBITDA. Source: own source. 
A3.4 Capex and D&A 
ASPI is in the process of implementing a programme of investment in major infrastructure 
projects under the original Agreement of 1997 and the IV Addendum of 2002, totaling €15.6bn. 
Projects with a value of €9.7bn have been completed as at 31 December 2017.  
The purpose of the investments are to increase the capacity of the existing motorway network 
on the country’s principal arteries, in order to improve traffic flow, road safety and service 
quality. 
In addition to the above programme, SPI new Single Concession Arrangement of 2007 also 
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• Extensions to projects already included in the Agreement of 1997, involving new specific 
network upgrades worth approximately €2bn.  
• A commitment to develop preliminary designs for the upgrade of certain sections of 
motorway operated under concession, totaling around 325km, at a cost of approximately 
€5bn.  
Autostrade Meridionali and Raccordo Autostradale Valle d’Aosta have completed their planned 
investment in major works under their respective concession arrangements.  
Autostrada Tirrenica opened the new section of motorway between Civitavecchia and Tarquinia 
to traffic in 2016. Completion of the remaining section from Tarquinia to Livorno is still at the 
planning stage and, at the end of 2017, a related financial plan was sent to the Grantor for initial 
examination. This only envisages construction of the section from Tarquinia to Ansedonia, plus 
an extra-urban link road between Ansedonia and Orbetello Scalo (amounting to a total estimated 
investment of approximately €0.6bn). 
 
Figure A3.8 ASPI capex plans. Source: ASPI Annual Reports. 
A3.5 Working Capital  
The operating working capital has been projected using the average of the last 3 years days of 
inventories, days of receivables and days of payables.  
A3.6 Other assumptions about the DCF 
The main assumptions regarding the DCF are:  
• Mid-year convention.  
• Statutory tax rate of 24.0% in Italy according to KPMG Corporate Tax Rates Table.  
• No Terminal Value.  
 
 
For more information regarding the assumptions of the Business Plan, please see the 
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Appendix 4. Summary of the BP: Base Case, Short-term Case and Medium-term Case 
 
Figure A.4.1 Summary of the Business Plan under the Base Case. Source: own source. 
(€m) 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 2028E 2029E 2030E 2031E 2032E 2033E 2034E 2035E 2036E 2037E 2038E 2042E 2043E 2050E CAGR CAGR
Period End Dec-18 Dec-19 Dec-20 Dec-21 Dec-22 Dec-23 Dec-24 Dec-25 Dec-26 Dec-27 Dec-28 Dec-29 Dec-30 Dec-31 Dec-32 Dec-33 Dec-34 Dec-35 Dec-36 Dec-37 Dec-38 Dec-42 Dec-43 Dec-50 18-23 18-38
Base Case
Total traffic 47,254 47,253 47,970 48,617 49,190 49,771 50,274 50,783 51,296 51,815 52,339 52,868 53,403 53,943 54,489 55,510 56,072 56,639 57,212 57,791 57,701 60,769 7,250 7,732 1% 1%
% growth 2% (0%) 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% (0%) 1% (88%) 1%
o/w ASPI concession 46,920 47,713 48,438 49,093 49,674 50,262 50,771 51,286 51,806 52,331 52,862 53,398 53,940 54,486 55,039 55,597 56,161 56,730 57,306 57,887 58,474 60,882 - - 1% 1%
Revenues 4,149 4,204 4,394 4,578 4,798 5,030 5,247 5,421 5,567 5,700 5,837 5,941 6,062 6,186 6,330 6,400 6,531 6,664 6,819 6,941 6,954 7,474 256 285 4% 3%
% growth 2% 1% 5% 4% 5% 5% 4% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 0% 2% (97%) 2%
o/w ASPI concession 3,750 3,905 4,091 4,274 4,492 4,717 4,934 5,103 5,243 5,371 5,503 5,602 5,718 5,836 5,974 6,081 6,207 6,336 6,485 6,602 6,739 7,315 - - 5% 3%
EBITDA 2,568 2,633 2,756 2,877 3,021 3,170 3,312 3,424 3,518 3,604 3,692 3,758 3,836 3,916 4,008 4,061 4,145 4,231 4,331 4,409 4,448 4,791 85 100 4% 3%
% margin 62% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 64% 64% 64% 64% 33% 35%
o/w ASPI concession 2,411 2,510 2,631 2,748 2,888 3,033 3,172 3,281 3,371 3,453 3,538 3,601 3,676 3,752 3,841 3,910 3,991 4,074 4,170 4,244 4,332 4,703 - - 5% 3%
EBIT 2,198 2,224 2,292 2,351 2,421 2,485 2,546 2,573 2,593 2,600 2,600 2,575 2,595 2,611 2,627 2,612 2,600 2,571 2,518 2,390 2,086 2,247 56 59 2% (0%)
% margin 53% 53% 52% 51% 50% 49% 49% 47% 47% 46% 45% 43% 43% 42% 42% 41% 40% 39% 37% 34% 30% 30% 22% 21%
Capex 909 921 962 1,003 1,051 1,102 936 968 758 776 795 809 347 354 363 367 374 382 391 398 398 79 3 3 4% (4%)
Change in WC (335) (16) 16 18 20 23 18 19 14 13 12 12 12 12 12 2 13 13 13 14 (21) 14 (660) 1 (158%) (13%)
D&A 370 409 465 526 600 685 767 851 925 1,003 1,092 1,183 1,241 1,305 1,381 1,449 1,545 1,660 1,813 2,019 2,361 2,544 29 41 13% 10%
Taxes on EBIT (528) (534) (550) (564) (581) (596) (611) (618) (622) (624) (624) (618) (623) (627) (631) (627) (624) (617) (604) (574) (501) (539) (13) (14) 2% (0%)
FCF 796 1,162 1,260 1,328 1,409 1,495 1,783 1,858 2,152 2,217 2,285 2,343 2,879 2,947 3,027 3,070 3,160 3,246 3,349 3,452 3,527 4,188 (591) 84 13% 8%
% FCF conversion 31% 44% 46% 46% 47% 47% 54% 54% 61% 62% 62% 62% 75% 75% 76% 76% 76% 77% 77% 78% 79% 87% (694%) 84%
Valuation date
WACC 5.9%
Benchmark WACC brokers 5.7%
EV
Equity Value
Equity Value associated to ATL
# of shares in issue (m) 826
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Figure A.4.2 Summary of the Business Plan under the Short-term Case. Source: own source.  
(€m) 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 2028E 2029E 2030E 2031E 2032E 2033E 2034E 2035E 2036E 2037E 2038E 2042E 2043E 2050E CAGR CAGR
Period End Dec-18 Dec-19 Dec-20 Dec-21 Dec-22 Dec-23 Dec-24 Dec-25 Dec-26 Dec-27 Dec-28 Dec-29 Dec-30 Dec-31 Dec-32 Dec-33 Dec-34 Dec-35 Dec-36 Dec-37 Dec-38 Dec-42 Dec-43 Dec-50 18-23 18-38
Short-term Case
Total traffic 46,367 45,435 45,230 44,950 45,481 46,017 46,483 46,953 47,427 47,907 48,392 48,881 49,375 49,874 50,379 51,313 51,832 52,356 52,886 53,421 53,257 7,183 7,250 7,732 (0%) 1%
% growth 0% (2%) (0%) (1%) 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% (0%) 1% 1% 1%
o/w ASPI concession 45,981 45,823 45,590 45,282 45,818 46,360 46,830 47,305 47,784 48,269 48,758 49,253 49,752 50,257 50,766 51,281 51,801 52,326 52,857 53,393 53,934 56,155 56,725 60,876 0% 1%
Revenues 4,074 4,051 4,155 4,250 4,454 4,668 4,869 5,030 5,165 5,288 5,416 5,511 5,624 5,739 5,872 5,933 6,055 6,179 6,322 6,435 6,437 253 256 285 3% 2%
% growth 0% (1%) 3% 2% 5% 5% 4% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 0% 1% 1% 2%
o/w ASPI concession 3,675 3,750 3,851 3,942 4,144 4,351 4,551 4,706 4,836 4,954 5,076 5,167 5,274 5,383 5,510 5,609 5,725 5,844 5,982 6,089 6,215 - - - 3% 3%
EBITDA 2,520 2,519 2,573 2,620 2,739 2,863 2,980 3,069 3,256 3,335 3,417 3,478 3,551 3,624 3,710 3,757 3,835 3,915 4,007 4,079 4,111 83 85 100 3% 2%
% margin 62% 62% 62% 62% 62% 61% 61% 61% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 64% 33% 33% 35%
o/w ASPI concession 2,363 2,411 2,476 2,535 2,664 2,797 2,926 3,026 3,109 3,185 3,263 3,322 3,391 3,461 3,543 3,606 3,681 3,757 3,846 3,915 3,996 - - - 3% 3%
EBIT 2,059 2,035 2,051 2,058 2,117 2,173 2,230 2,259 2,399 2,431 2,460 2,469 2,486 2,497 2,509 2,487 2,470 2,432 2,366 2,220 1,883 47 49 52 1% (0%)
% margin 51% 50% 49% 48% 48% 47% 46% 45% 46% 46% 45% 45% 44% 44% 43% 42% 41% 39% 37% 35% 29% 19% 19% 18%
Capex 642 638 654 669 701 735 557 576 359 368 377 383 341 349 357 360 368 375 384 391 391 3 3 3 3% (2%)
Change in WC (342) (13) 19 20 29 32 27 28 (61) 12 11 11 11 11 12 2 12 12 12 13 (22) 1 1 1 (162%) (13%)
D&A 461 484 522 562 622 689 751 811 857 905 957 1,009 1,065 1,127 1,201 1,270 1,366 1,483 1,641 1,859 2,228 36 37 48 8% 8%
Taxes on EBIT (494) (488) (492) (494) (508) (522) (535) (542) (576) (583) (590) (593) (597) (599) (602) (597) (593) (584) (568) (533) (452) (11) (12) (12) 1% (0%)
FCF 1,042 1,380 1,445 1,478 1,559 1,638 1,915 1,979 2,261 2,397 2,461 2,514 2,624 2,688 2,762 2,801 2,887 2,968 3,068 3,168 3,246 70 72 86 9% 6%
% FCF conversion 41% 55% 56% 56% 57% 57% 64% 64% 69% 72% 72% 72% 74% 74% 74% 75% 75% 76% 77% 78% 79% 84% 84% 85%
Valuation date
WACC 6.6%
Benchmark WACC brokers 6.6%
EV
Equity Value
Equity Value associated to ATL
# of shares in issue (m) 826
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Figure A.4.3 Summary of the Business Plan under the Medium-term Case. Source: own source.  
 
(€m) 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 2028E 2029E 2030E 2031E 2032E 2033E 2034E 2035E 2036E 2037E 2038E 2042E 2043E 2050E CAGR CAGR
Period End Dec-18 Dec-19 Dec-20 Dec-21 Dec-22 Dec-23 Dec-24 Dec-25 Dec-26 Dec-27 Dec-28 Dec-29 Dec-30 Dec-31 Dec-32 Dec-33 Dec-34 Dec-35 Dec-36 Dec-37 Dec-38 Dec-42 Dec-43 Dec-50 18-23 18-38
Medium-term Case
Total traffic 46,367 45,435 45,230 44,950 45,481 46,017 46,483 46,953 47,427 47,907 48,392 48,881 49,375 49,874 50,379 51,313 51,832 52,356 52,886 53,421 53,257 56,053 7,250 7,732 (0%) 1%
% growth 0% (2%) (0%) (1%) 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% (0%) 1% (87%) 1%
o/w ASPI concession 45,981 45,823 45,590 45,282 45,818 46,360 46,830 47,305 47,784 48,269 48,758 49,253 49,752 50,257 50,766 51,281 51,801 52,326 52,857 53,393 53,934 56,155 - - 0% 1%
Revenues 4,074 4,007 4,111 4,204 4,406 4,618 4,816 4,976 5,109 5,231 5,357 5,452 5,563 5,677 5,809 5,869 5,989 6,112 6,254 6,364 6,365 6,836 256 285 3% 2%
% growth 0% (2%) 3% 2% 5% 5% 4% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 0% 2% (96%) 2%
o/w ASPI concession 3,675 3,706 3,806 3,896 4,095 4,300 4,497 4,652 4,780 4,897 5,016 5,106 5,212 5,320 5,446 5,543 5,659 5,776 5,912 6,018 6,143 6,669 - - 3% 3%
EBITDA 2,520 2,497 2,556 2,610 2,733 2,861 2,984 3,078 3,220 3,298 3,379 3,440 3,511 3,584 3,668 3,715 3,792 3,871 3,962 4,033 4,064 4,375 85 100 3% 2%
% margin 62% 62% 62% 62% 62% 62% 62% 62% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 64% 64% 33% 35%
o/w ASPI concession 2,363 2,383 2,447 2,505 2,633 2,765 2,892 2,991 3,073 3,148 3,225 3,283 3,351 3,421 3,501 3,564 3,638 3,714 3,801 3,869 3,949 4,288 - - 3% 3%
EBIT 2,124 2,071 2,082 2,082 2,133 2,176 2,218 2,228 2,298 2,298 2,291 2,261 2,276 2,285 2,294 2,274 2,257 2,221 2,161 2,029 1,724 1,868 54 57 0% (1%)
% margin 52% 52% 51% 50% 48% 47% 46% 45% 45% 44% 43% 41% 41% 40% 39% 39% 38% 36% 35% 32% 27% 27% 21% 20%
Capex 959 942 967 989 1,036 1,086 924 955 748 766 785 798 340 348 356 360 367 374 383 390 390 72 3 3 3% (4%)
Change in WC (342) (21) 14 16 24 27 22 23 (29) 12 11 11 11 11 11 2 12 12 12 13 (22) 13 (602) 1 (160%) (13%)
D&A 396 426 475 527 601 685 766 850 922 1,000 1,088 1,178 1,235 1,299 1,374 1,441 1,535 1,650 1,801 2,005 2,340 2,507 31 43 12% 9%
Taxes on EBIT (510) (497) (500) (500) (512) (522) (532) (535) (551) (552) (550) (543) (546) (548) (551) (546) (542) (533) (519) (487) (414) (448) (13) (14) 0% (1%)
FCF 709 1,036 1,104 1,137 1,209 1,280 1,549 1,611 1,892 1,993 2,055 2,110 2,636 2,699 2,773 2,811 2,895 2,975 3,073 3,169 3,238 3,868 (532) 84 13% 8%
% FCF conversion 28% 41% 43% 44% 44% 45% 52% 52% 59% 60% 61% 61% 75% 75% 76% 76% 76% 77% 78% 79% 80% 88% (625%) 84%
Valuation date
WACC 6.3%
Benchmark WACC brokers 6.1%
EV
Equity Value
Equity Value associated to ATL
# of shares in issue (m) 826
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